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Executive summary
The regulatory control of nuclear materials (nuclear safeguards) is a prerequisite for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy in Finland. In order to maintain the Finnish part of the 
international agreements on nuclear non-proliferation –  mainly the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) –  this regulatory control is implemented by the Nuclear Materials Section of 
the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK).
The results of STUK's nuclear safeguards inspection activities in 2015 continued to 
demonstrate that the Finnish licence holders take good care of their nuclear materials. 
There were no indications of undeclared nuclear materials or activities and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with the stakeholders' declarations. 
Safeguards are applied to nuclear materials and activities that can lead to the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. These safeguards include nuclear materials accountancy, control, 
security and the reporting of nuclear fuel cycle-related activities. The main parties involved 
in a state nuclear safeguards system are the facilities that use nuclear materials, often 
referred to as “licence holders” or “operators”– and the state authority. A licence holder 
shall take good care of its nuclear materials and the state authority shall provide the 
regulatory control to ensure that the licence holder fulfils the requirements. The control 
of nuclear expert organisations, technology holders and suppliers, to ensure the non-
proliferation of sensitive technology, is also a growing global challenge for all stakeholders. 
In Finnish legislation, all these stakeholders are dealt with as users of nuclear energy. At 
the end of 2013, the revised STUK requirements were published as regulatory guides on 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards, called YVL guides. According to the Guide YVL D.1 
Regulatory Control of Nuclear Safeguards all the stakeholders were requested to prepare 
their safeguards manuals as a part of their quality managements systems. During 2015, in 
total 19 draft manuals were submitted to STUK, and 14 of those were approved.
Finland has quite significant nuclear power production, but the related nuclear industry is 
rather limited. Most of the declared nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium) 
in Finland reside at the nuclear power plants in Olkiluoto and Loviisa. Additionally, there 
is the research reactor in Espoo, as well as a dozen minor nuclear material holders in 
Finland. Nuclear dual-use items and instrumentation for the Olkiluoto 3 reactor under 
construction are being imported and installed. The import licences are reviewed as 
applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology. The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission made their site visits to the construction 
site prior to the installation of safeguards instrumentation and fuel delivery.
The planning and design of the Olkiluoto 4 reactor and a new nuclear power plant site, 
Hanhikivi in Pyhäjoki, were authorised in 2010. The safeguards systems for these new 
reactors shall be designed together with facility design and development. Similarly to the 
Olkiluoto 3 reactor that is under construction, the import licences for the new facilities 
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are reviewed as applicable to ensure the peaceful use of the technology and sensitive 
information. The operators submitted the preliminary Basic Technical Characteristics 
to the European Commission and obtained Material Balance Area codes for the future 
reactors before the vendor companies were selected. During 2015, the construction 
licence application for the new Hanhikivi plant was submitted to the Government. 
The authorisation of the Olkiluoto 4 unit expired as the operator did not apply for 
the construction licence within the 5 year period of validity of the authorisation, i.e. 
the  Decision-in-Principle by the Government, so the material balance area code was 
also withdrawn. The research reactor was shut down in 2015 and the preparations for 
decommissioning continue in Espoo. On the other hand, in order to continue research 
activities, the new VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety was under construction at the research 
campus in Espoo. 
Uranium production as one of the by-products of nickel at the Talvivaara mine was given 
approval by the Government in accordance with the nuclear energy legislation in March 
2012. In 2013, the mining company constructed the uranium extraction plant, but the 
Supreme Administrative Court rescinded the approval, owing to claims of environmental 
and economic issues in December 2013 before the commissioning of the plant. The 
difficulties continued in 2014, and finally in November 2014 Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. filed 
for bankruptcy. During 2015 a new operator, Terrafame Mining Oy took over the mining 
and milling activities, but no uranium extraction nor safeguards activities took place at 
Talvivaara. Currently, uranium residuals are extracted from the nickel at Harjavalta 
Nickel Refinery and at Freeport Cobalt in Kokkola, and reported to STUK and to the 
European Commission.
STUK maintains a national nuclear materials accountancy system and verifies that 
nuclear activities in Finland are carried out in accordance with the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree, European Union Safeguards Regulation and international 
agreements. These tasks are performed to verify that Finland can assure itself and the 
international community of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and materials. In 
addition to this, the IAEA evaluates the success of the state safeguards system, and the 
European Commission participates in safeguarding the materials under its jurisdiction.
The application for the construction licence for the disposal facility, which consists of 
the encapsulation plant and the geological repository, was submitted to the Government 
in December 2012. During 2013 and 2014, the IAEA and the Commission defined the 
requirements for the safeguards equipment for the encapsulation plant in an interactive 
process with STUK and Posiva. These needs were included in the STUK statement and 
safety evaluation concerning the construction licence application finalised in February 
2015. In November 2015 the Government granted the construction licence. In the 
meanwhile, the detailed design of the facility was updated resulting in the continuation of 
the planning of the safeguards system.
The number of the routine inspection days of the international inspectorates has been 
reduced significantly due to the state-level safeguards approach for Finland, which 
has been in force since 2008. The number of international inspection days per year is 
approximately 25. Neither the IAEA nor the Commission made any remarks nor did 
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they present any required actions based on their inspections during 2015. By means 
of their nuclear materials accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders enabled 
STUK to fulfil its own obligations under the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards. In safeguards, STUK continues with 40 annual inspections and 60 inspection 
days. In 2014, the number of inspection days was significantly higher owing to the 
extensive survey campaign to verify the design of the planned geological repository, called 
Onkalo. In 2015 a concise survey campaign was carried out at Onkalo resulting in an  
increased number of inspection days since 2013. The number of annual inspection days for 
nuclear material holders has remained at 20 days per international inspectorate. 
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is one of the elements of the 
global nuclear non-proliferation effort. STUK has two roles in relation to the CTBT: 
STUK operates the Finnish National Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the radionuclide 
laboratories (RL07) in the CTBT International Monitoring Network (IMS). The main task 
of the FiNDC is to inspect data received from the International Monitoring System and 
to inform the national authority, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, about any indications of 
a nuclear weapons test. The FiNDC falls under the non-proliferation process in STUK’s 
organisation, together with the regulatory control of nuclear materials.
A major goal of all current CTBT-related activities is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. 
An important prerequisite for such positive political action is that the verification system 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) is functioning and 
able to provide assurance to all parties that it is impossible to make a clandestine nuclear 
test without detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role in the common endeavour, 
so that the verification system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection task.
The human resources development at the Nuclear Materials Section during 2015 was 
focused on nuclear material control: in particular, information security issues were 
addressed. This was partly due to the need to regulate the construction of the disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel at the Olkiluoto repository site. 
In addition, STUK contributed to educational workshops and training courses for 
authorities who represent nuclear newcomers: countries that aim at uranium production 
or nuclear power in cooperation with the IAEA. STUK and Finnish Customs continued the 
joint multi-year border monitoring development project. The project covers customs officers 
training as well as the updating of technical equipment and of operational procedures. 
In 2014, the partnerships programme between King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and STUK began supporting 
the establishment of the Saudi Arabia’s regulatory authority in relation to its nuclear 
energy programme. In the field of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and 
security experts continued practical cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
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The regulatory control of nuclear materials is a 
prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy 
in Finland. In order for Finland to have nuclear 
industry, most of which consists of nuclear energy 
production, it must be ensured that nuclear ma-
terials, equipment and technology are used only 
for their declared peaceful purposes. The basis for 
nuclear safeguards is the national system for the 
regulatory control of nuclear materials and ac-
tivities. Nuclear safeguards represent an integral 
part of nuclear safety and nuclear security and 
are applied to both large- and medium-size nu-
clear industry and to small-scale nuclear material 
activities. Along with the safeguards, the regula-
tory process for nuclear non-proliferation includes 
transport control, export control, border control, 
international cooperation, and monitoring compli-
ance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT).
In Finland, STUK is the regulatory author-
ity with regard to the implementation of nuclear 
non-proliferation. In November 2012, a new STUK 
strategy for the period 2013–2017 was announced, 
and the organisation was renewed to support the 
implementation of the new strategy. In 2013, STUK 
was reorganised to implement the strategy, and 
furthermore in 2015 to achieve effectiveness re-
quirements set by the Government. These changes 
did not considerably affect the mandatory imple-
mentation of non-proliferation control at STUK, but 
they provide framework for the interaction between 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards. Parallel 
to this, STUK requirement documents, the YVL 
guides were under renewal and were finally issued 
on 1 December 2013. STUK safeguards require-
ments concerning nuclear material accountancy, 
safeguards-based procedures and the implemen-
1 Nuclear non-proliferation 
implementation in Finland
tation of the Additional Protocol are merged in 
one regulatory guide D.1 Regulatory Control of 
Nuclear Safeguards. This instructs all stakehold-
ers in the Finnish nuclear field in how to comply 
with the current national and international safe-
guards regulations. During 2014, the licence holders 
were obliged to review their manuals and evaluate 
how the requirements can be implemented. During 
2015, STUK made decisions on the implementation 
practices for the licence holders. Also, the manuals 
prepared by other stakeholders were reviewed and 
approved for the implementation of safeguards.
1.1 International safeguards 
agreements and national legislation
Nuclear safeguards are based on international 
agreements, the most important and extensive of 
which is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). 
The Treaty Establishing the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty) is the basis 
for the nuclear safeguards system of the European 
Union (EU). Finland is bound by both of these 
treaties, and also has several bilateral agreements 
in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
When Finland joined the EU, the bilateral agree-
ments with Australia, Canada and the USA were 
partly substituted with the corresponding Euratom 
agreements (see Appendix 3 for the relevant legis-
lation). 
In 2015, two new agreements on cooperation in 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy for Finland entered 
into force, one with Republic of Korea and the oth-
er one with the Russian Federation. Both of these 
agreements cover cooperation in scientific and 
applied research, exchange of scientific and tech-
nological information, transfer of nuclear material, 
10
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non-nuclear material, equipment and technology 
as well as provision of relevant technological con-
sultancy and services.  In addition, the new agree-
ment with Russian also includes provisions for 
nuclear liability. That is a new feature which was 
not included in the old agreement, which expired 
in 2004. The third agreement was signed with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The ratification of this 
agreement is in progress.
Finland was the first state where an 
INFCIRC¹/153-type comprehensive nuclear Safe-
guards Agreement with the IAEA entered into 
force (INFCIRC/155, 9 February 1972). When 
Finland joined the EU (1 January 1995), this 
agreement was suspended and subsequently the 
Safeguards Agreement between the non-nuclear 
weapon Member States of the EU, the Euratom 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force 
in Finland on 1 October 1995. Finland signed the 
Additional Protocol (AP) to the INFCIRC/193 in 
Vienna on 22 September 1998 with the other EU 
Member States, and ratified it on 8 August 2000. 
The Additional Protocol entered into force on 30 
April 2004, once all the EU Member States had 
ratified it. The scope and mandate for Euratom 
nuclear safeguards are defined in the European 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005.
After Finland joined the EU as a Member State 
and thereby subjected itself to the Euratom nu-
clear safeguards, a comprehensive national safe-
guards system was still maintained and further 
developed. The basic motivation for this is the 
responsibility assumed by Finland for its nuclear 
safeguards and nuclear security under the obliga-
tions of the NPT, and also to ensure fulfilment of 
the Euratom requirements.
The national nuclear safeguards derive their 
mandate and scope from the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act and Decree. These were amended dur-
ing 2008 as a result of the general constitution-
based renewal of the Finnish nuclear legislation 
system. The operator’s obligation to have a nu-
clear material accountancy system and the right 
of STUK to oversee the planning and generation 
of design information for new facilities was intro-
duced from STUK requirements into the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. 
In 2015, the Nuclear Energy Act was amended 
on 1 July in such a way that the Government 
Decrees on nuclear safety, nuclear waste man-
agement, emergency preparedness and nuclear 
security were replaced by new STUK Regulations. 
Parallel to this, a new regulation was issued on 
mining and milling aiming at the production of 
uranium or thorium. Some general features such 
as on radiation doses were introduced from the 
old Government Decrees into the Nuclear Energy 
Decree, but most of the detailed requirements 
were included in the new STUK Regulations that 
entered into force on 1 January 2016 parallel to the 
amendment of the Nuclear Energy Decree.
As stipulated by the Act, STUK issues detailed 
requirements (the YVL Guides) on safety, security 
and safeguards that apply to the use of nuclear en-
ergy. STUK’s safeguards requirements for all users 
of nuclear energy during all phases of the nuclear 
fuel cycle are set in YVL Guide D.1 Regulatory 
Control of Nuclear Safeguards. Areas covered in 
the new comprehensive guide include the obliga-
tions and measures stemming from the Additional 
Protocol for the Safeguards Agreement and from 
recent developments. All stakeholders must de-
scribe their own safeguards system in written form 
(as a nuclear materials handbook or safeguards 
manual), in order to ease their task of fulfilling 
their obligations and to guarantee the effective 
and comprehensive operation of the national safe-
guards system. In the new guide, there are also 
specific national requirements for the disposal of 
spent nuclear fuel in a geological repository. In 
general, nuclear safeguards control applies to:
•	 nuclear	 material	 (special	 fissionable	 material	
and source material)
•	 nuclear	dual-use	items	(non-nuclear	materials,	
components, equipment and technology suitable 
for producing nuclear energy or nuclear weap-
ons as specified in INFCIRC/254, Part 1)
•	 licence	 holders’	 activities,	 expertise,	 prepared-
ness and competence including information se-
curity
•	 R&D	and	other	activities	related	to	the	nuclear	
fuel cycle as defined in the Additional Protocol
•	 design	 and	 construction	 of	 new	 nuclear	 facili-
ties.
¹  INFCIRC = IAEA Information Circulars
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1.2 Parties of the Finnish nuclear 
safeguards system
The main parties involved in the Finnish nucle-
ar safeguards system are the authorities and the 
stakeholders. Undistributed responsibility for the 
safety, security and safeguards of the use of nu-
clear energy rests with the stakeholder. It is the 
responsibility of STUK as the regulatory state au-
thority to ensure that the licence holders and all 
other stakeholders in the nuclear field comply with 
the requirements of the law and the nuclear safe-
guards agreements. To complement the national 
effort, international control is necessary in order to 
demonstrate credibility and the proper functioning 
of the national safeguards system.
1.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA) is responsi-
ble for national non-proliferation policy and inter-
national agreements. The MFA is responsible for 
the export control of nuclear materials and other 
nuclear dual-use items, including sensitive nuclear 
technology. The Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy (MEE) is responsible for the supreme com-
mand and control of nuclear matters. MEE is re-
sponsible for the legislation related to nuclear ener-
gy and is also the competent authority mentioned in 
the Euratom Treaty. Other ministries as well, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence, contribute to the efficient functioning of 
the national nuclear safeguards system.
1.2.2 STUK
As per the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK is 
responsible for maintaining the national nuclear 
safeguards system in order to prevent the pro-
liferation of nuclear weapons. STUK regulates 
the stakeholders’ activities and ensures that the 
obligations of international agreements concern-
ing the peaceful use of nuclear materials are met. 
Regulatory control by STUK includes the posses-
sion, use, production, transfer (national and inter-
national), handling, storage, transport, export and 
import of nuclear materials and nuclear dual-use 
items. STUK is in charge of Finland’s approval and 
consultation process for inspectors from the IAEA 
and the European Commission. 
Nuclear safeguards by the Nuclear Materials 
Section of STUK cover all typical measures of a 
State System of Accounting for and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (SSAC), together with many 
other activities. STUK reviews the stakeholders’ 
reports (operational notifications, inventory re-
ports), inspects their accountancy, facilities and 
transport arrangements on site, and performs sys-
tem audits. STUK runs a verification programme 
for nuclear activities to assess the completeness 
and correctness of the declarations by the licence 
holders. Nuclear safeguards on the national level 
are closely linked with other functions of nuclear 
materials control and non-proliferation: licensing, 
export control, border control, transport control, 
combating illicit trafficking, physical protection 
Figure 1. Non-proliferation framework in STUK’s organisation.
Radiation Practices 
Regulation
Administration
Director General
Public Affairs
Safeguards 
Measurements and 
Technology
Environmental 
Radiation 
Surveillance 
and Emergency 
Preparedness
Nuclear
Security
Nuclear Safeguards
CTBT National  
Data Centre
Nuclear Waste 
and Material 
Regulation
Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation
12
STUK-B 200
of nuclear materials, and monitoring compliance 
with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT). Nuclear safety and particularly nuclear 
security objectives are closely complemented by 
safeguards objectives. For this reason, the research, 
development and regulatory units in the fields of 
safety, security and safeguards at STUK cooper-
ate under the non-proliferation framework. The 
scope of non-proliferation work is linked to many 
organisational units of STUK (Fig. 1). During the 
reorganisations in 2013 and 2015, the competences 
in non-proliferation control were split into several 
organisational units. Only the core competences 
were maintained in the Nuclear Materials Section 
of the Nuclear Waste and Material Regulation. 
Consequently, interaction and cooperation between 
the reorganised units have been activated. The 
roles of the different units are described in detail 
in Chapter 4.
1.2.3 Licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy
The essential parts of the national nuclear safe-
guards system are the licence holders and other 
users of nuclear energy – in nuclear terminology, 
often called the operators and other stakeholders. 
In the Finnish legislation, the term ’use of nuclear 
energy’ comprises a wide range of nuclear-related 
Table 1. Status of regulatory documents for material balance areas in Finland at the end of 2015.
MBA, location BTC,  
last upd.
Site (AP), 
founded
PSP,  
in force
FA,  
in force
Licence/DiP,  
in force  
(from/until)
SG Manual, 
approved 
WL0V, Loviisa 3.2.2015 S SF L0V1, 
8.7.2004
Yes,  
4.5.1998
No Operation,  
LO1 until 31.12.2027  
LO2 until 31.12.2030
Yes,  
30.11.2012
W0L1, Olkiluoto 9.4.2014 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operation,  
until 31.12.2018
24.8.2015
W0L2, Olkiluoto 9.4.2014 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operation,  
until 31.12.2018
24.8.2015
W0LS, Olkiluoto 20.3.2015 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
Yes,  
7.6.2007
No Operation,  
until 31.12.2018
24.8.2015
W0L3, Olkiluoto 19.3.2015 S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004
No No Construction, granted 
17.2.2005
24.8.2015
W0L4, Olkiluoto 12.11.2012 to 
be withdrawn
S SF 0LK1, 
8.7.2004  
(add. 2013)
No No DiP, 1.7.2010, expired No
W0LE, Olkiluoto 21.5.2015 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
No, included in 
WOLF manual
W0LF, Olkiluoto 21.5.2015 S SF POS1, 
31.3.2010
No No Construction, 
12.11.2015
6.11.2015
WFV1, Pyhäjoki 6.7.2015  
(prel. DI)
No No No DiP,  
1.7.2010
No
WRRF, Espoo 31.12.2014 S SF VTT1, 
8.7.2004
Yes,  
9.7.1998
No Operation, until 
31.12.2023
31.3.2011  
update requested
WNSC, Espoo 31.12.2014 No No No Under construction to be prepared
WFRS, Helsinki 10.4.2014 S SF STUK, 
8.7.2004
No No Not required (as an 
authority)
29.10.2015
WHEL, Helsinki 8.11.2006 S SF HYRL, 
8.7.2004
No No Operation, until 
31.12.2017
30.6.2015
WKK0, Kokkola 30.5.2013 No No No Operation, until 
31.12.2019
18.6.2015
WNNH, Harjavalta 16.11.2010 No No No Operation,  
until 31.12.2019
18.6.2015
WTAL, Talvivaara 29.11.2010 No No No No No,  
drafted in 2013
WDPJ, Jyväskylä 14.5.2012 No No No Operation,  
until 31.12.2024
24.2.2015
Finnish material balance areas and their status as 31.12.2015. MBA (material balance code), BTC (Basic Technical Characteristics, i.e. Design 
Information), AP (the Additional Protocol), PSP (Particular Safeguards Provisions set by the European Commission), FA (Facility Attachment prepared 
by the IAEA), DiP (Decision-in-Principle, date of Parliament approval, in force 5 years).
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Figure 3. Plutonium in spent nuclear fuel in Finland in 1990–2015.
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Figure 2. Uranium accumulation in Finland in 1990–2015.
activities, such as those defined in the Addition 
Protocol. These stakeholders, in particular the li-
cence holders, perform key functions in the na-
tional safeguards system: control of the authentic 
source data of their nuclear materials in addition 
to accountancy for nuclear materials at the facil-
ity level for each of their material balance areas 
(MBA). Each licence holder or other user of nuclear 
energy must operate its safeguards system in ac-
cordance with its own nuclear materials handbook 
or safeguards manual. The requirements of the 
Additional Protocol are integrated in the handbook 
to facilitate implementation of safeguards at the 
site, including the material balance areas. Other 
stakeholders too, as users of nuclear energy, are 
requested to have a safeguards manual to facilitate 
safeguards implementation. The nuclear materials 
handbook or safeguards manual is a part of the 
operator’s quality system and is reviewed and ap-
proved by STUK.
With the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
submitted by a licence holder or by other stake-
holder as groundwork, the European Commission 
adopts particular safeguards provisions (PSP) for 
that licence holder. PSPs are drawn taking op-
erational and technical constraints into account 
in close consultation with both the person or un-
dertaking concerned and the relevant member 
state. Until PSPs are adopted, the person or un-
dertaking shall apply the general provisions of the 
Commission regulation No 302/2005. A facility at-
tachment (FA) is prepared in cooperation with the 
IAEA for each facility to describe arrangements 
specific to that facility. The status of the regulatory 
documents for the Finnish material balance areas 
is shown in Table 1.
A total of 99.8% of all nuclear materials in 
Finland reside at the nuclear power plants (NPP). 
The amounts of nuclear materials (uranium, plu-
tonium) in Finland in 1990–2015 are presented in 
Figures 2 and 3.
14
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Fortum (MBA WL0V)
Fortum is a partly state-owned energy company, 
one of the largest in the Nordic countries. Fortum 
operates power plants of several types including 
nuclear.
The nuclear power plant operated by Fortum 
Power and Heat is located on Hästholmen Island 
in Loviisa on the southeast coast of Finland. This 
first NPP to have been built in Finland hosts two 
VVER-440 type power reactor units, with a cur-
rent net electrical output of 496 MW for each of 
the units, Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2. Loviisa 1 started 
its electricity production in 1977 and Loviisa 2 in 
1980. These two units share common fresh and 
spent fuel storages. For nuclear safeguards ac-
countancy purposes, the entire NPP is counted as 
one material balance area (MBA code WL0V). The 
electricity generated by the Loviisa NPP consti-
tutes about 10% of electrical production in Finland 
as a whole.
Most of the fuel for the Loviisa NPP has 
been imported from the Soviet Union/Russian 
Federation. The spent fuel of the Loviisa NPP was 
returned to the Soviet Union/Russian Federation 
until 1996 and since then has been stored in the 
interim storage due to a change in Finnish nuclear 
legislation, which forbids the import and export of 
nuclear waste in general, including spent fuel.
As per the requirements of the Additional 
Protocol, the Loviisa NPP site (SSFLOV1) com-
prises Hästholmen Island as a whole and extends 
to the main gate on the mainland. Particular 
Safeguards Provisions for the Loviisa NPP, which 
define the European Commission’s nuclear safe-
guards procedures for the facility, have been in 
force since 1998. The Facility Attachment of the 
Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been 
prepared by the IAEA for the Loviisa NPP.
Teollisuuden Voima (MBAs W0L1, 
W0L2, W0LS, W0L3 and W0L4)
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO) owns and oper-
ates a nuclear power plant on the Olkiluoto Island 
in Eurajoki on the west coast of Finland. The 
Olkiluoto NPP consists of two nuclear power re-
actor units, Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2, and an 
interim spent fuel storage. Olkiluoto 1 was con-
nected to the electricity grid in 1978 and Olkiluoto 
2 in 1980. These units have been upgraded to the 
current output of 880 MW. The Olkiluoto NPP is 
responsible for about 17% of all electricity produc-
tion in Finland. There are three active material 
balance areas (MBA codes W0L1, W0L2, W0LS) at 
the Olkiluoto NPP.
Presently, the uranium in TVO’s nuclear fuel 
is mainly of Australian, Canadian and Russian 
origin. This uranium is enriched in the Russian 
Federation or in the EU, and the fuel assemblies 
are manufactured in Spain and Sweden.
The Finnish Government granted a licence for 
constructing a new nuclear reactor, Olkiluoto 3, 
on 17 February 2005. As a part of the licensing 
process, TVO’s plan for arranging the necessary 
measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons was approved by STUK. The construction 
and assembly work of the reactor unit is under 
way. The European Commission has assigned the 
MBA code W0L3 for Olkiluoto 3. 
The decisions for new nuclear facilities were 
granted by the Government on 6 May 2010. One of 
these was the Olkiluoto 4 reactor. Although the re-
actor type was not specified yet, TVO submitted the 
preliminary basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
in November 2012 in order to obtain the MBA code 
W0L4 for future correspondence. However, in June 
2015 TVO decided that no construction licence for 
Olkiluoto 4 will be applied for during the 5-year pe-
riod of validity of the Decision-in-Principle ratified 
by the Parliament on 1 July 2010. Consequently, 
the Decision-in-Principle expired at the end June 
2015; and consequently, the MBA code was with-
drawn in 2015 as confirmed by the Commission in 
a letter in January 2016.
TVO owns most of the area of the Olkiluoto 
Island, but the NPP site (SSFOLK1) as per the 
requirements of the Additional Protocol currently 
comprises the fenced areas around the reactor 
units, the spent fuel storage and the storage for low 
and intermediate level waste, and the Olkiluoto 3 
construction site. Particular Safeguards Provisions 
for the Olkiluoto NPP have been in force since 
2007. The Facility Attachment of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not been prepared 
by the IAEA for the Olkiluoto NPP.
Fennovoima (MBA WFV1) 
Fennovoima was founded in 2007 to be a new 
nuclear power operator in Finland. Fennovoima 
started preparatory works with several vendor 
candidates for this purpose and submitted its ap-
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plication for a nuclear power plant in 2009. The 
Government approved a Decision-in-Principle in 
2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site, 
either at Karsikkoniemi in Simo or at Hanhikivi in 
Pyhäjoki. The applicant was requested to submit 
its nuclear construction licence application within 
five years and to submit a plan for its nuclear 
waste management within six years. The prelimi-
nary Basic Technical Characteristics (BTC) was 
submitted to the European Commission in sum-
mer 2013, and the MBA code WFV1 was assigned 
to the future material balance area once the se-
lection of the future Hanhikivi site at Pyhäjoki 
was decided. However, after negotiations with the 
original vendors and a new candidate, Fennovoima 
announced in December 2013 that the plant sup-
plier would be Rusatom Overseas. Owing to the 
changes in ownership and reactor type described 
in the ratified application, a reassessment of the 
Decision-in-Principle was initiated in 2013. The 
reassessment was completed on 5 December 2014 
when the Parliament endorsed the Decision-in-
Principle of 2010 for the different reactor type. 
Fennovoima submitted the construction licence 
application to the Government on 30 June 2015. 
In September 2015 the Ministry of Employment 
and the Economy launched the process to evaluate 
the application with the desired timeline at the 
end of 2017. The Hanhikivi site (according to the 
Additional Protocol) will be declared stepwise as 
the project proceeds from a virgin green site to the 
preparatory work site and finally to the nuclear 
power plant. The current estimate is that the first 
Hanhikivi site declaration will be submitted in 
2017.
VTT FiR1 research reactor (MBA WRRF)
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
at facilities other than nuclear power plants. The 
most significant of those facilities is the VTT re-
search reactor FiR1 (MBA code WRRF), located in 
Otaniemi, Espoo. The research reactor was the first 
nuclear reactor built in Finland at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT). It reached criti-
cality on 27 March 1962. On 12 July 2012, the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy and 
VTT announced the plan to close down the reactor 
and to launch the decommissioning process. The 
reactor was shut down in June; and, finally on 7 
December 2015 the reactor was made subcritical. 
Particular Safeguards Provisions that define 
the European Commission’s nuclear safeguards 
procedures for the facility have been in force for 
VTT FiR1 from 1998. The Facility Attachment of 
the Safeguards Agreement INFCIRC/193 has not 
been prepared by the IAEA for the research reac-
tor. 
In contrast to this, a new building, the VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety, for experimental nu-
clear research will be built at the Espoo premises 
of VTT. The preliminary BTC for the new building, 
already under construction, was submitted to the 
Commission by the end of 2014; and, consequently 
the MBA code WNSC was assigned for the future 
material balance area in 2015. In the new building 
some of the experimental research carried cur-
rently out in the building containing the research 
reactor will be continued. Both these decisions will 
have long-lasting effects, due to the need for licenc-
es, permits, contracts and environmental impact 
assessment. This also affects safeguards, as the 
nuclear materials must be kept under the control 
of competent personnel at both material balance 
areas.
The VTT FiR1 site (SSFVTT1), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, currently 
consists of the whole building around the research 
reactor, though there are non-nuclear companies 
and university premises in the same building.
STUK (MBA WFRS)
Small quantities of nuclear materials are stored 
by the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) – mainly materials no longer in use and 
hence taken into STUK’s custody. STUK was 
founded in 1958 and has been located at its cur-
rent premises in Roihupelto, Helsinki since 1994. 
The STUK MBA (WFRS) consists of the STUK 
headquarters and the “Central interim storage for 
small-user radioactive waste” at the Olkiluoto NPP 
site.
The STUK site (SSFSTUK), as per the re-
quirements of the Additional Protocol, consists of 
the premises of STUK’s headquarters located in 
Helsinki. The storage at Olkiluoto is included in 
the NPP’s site declaration.
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The University of Helsinki, Laboratory 
of Radiochemistry (MBA WHEL)
The Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University 
of Helsinki (HYRL) uses small amounts of nuclear 
materials. HYRL is located at the Kumpula univer-
sity campus in Helsinki.
The HYRL site (SSFHYRL), as per the require-
ments of the Additional Protocol, comprises the 
whole building that hosts the laboratory.
Freeport Cobalt Oy (MBA WKK0)
The by-products of the Kokkola Chemicals facil-
ity’s cobalt purification process contain uranium, 
which qualifies these by-products as nuclear mate-
rial. Thus, the Kokkola Chemicals has an operat-
ing licence to produce, store and handle nuclear 
material.	 In	 2013,	 Freeport-McMoRan	 Copper	 &	
Gold Inc acquired the ownership of the OM Group. 
The operator is Freeport Cobalt Oy, and the facility 
is located in Kokkola on the west coast of Finland.
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy (MBA WNNH)
Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy operates the nickel 
refining plant at Harjavalta in western Finland. 
The plant was commissioned in 1959, expanded 
in 1995 and again in 2002. Norilsk Nickel Finland 
became a part of the Russian-based Norilsk Nickel 
as a result of the OM Group’s nickel business ac-
quisition in 2007. The refinery of Norilsk Nickel 
Harjavalta employs a technique of sulphuric acid 
leaching of nickel products. Uranium residuals will 
be extracted from the nickel products, e.g., from the 
Talvivaara mine. In March 2010, STUK granted a 
licence to extract less than 10 tonnes of uranium 
per year. The Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta company 
submitted the basic technical characteristics (BTC) 
to the European Commission in December 2010.
Terrafame Oy (MBA WTAL)
On 9 February 2010, the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd 
mining company announced its interest in inves-
tigating the recovery of uranium as a separate 
product from its sulphide ore body. The environ-
mental impact assessment was carried out in 2010 
and, according to nuclear energy legislation; the 
licence to recover uranium was granted by the 
Government in March 2012. The Basic Technical 
Characteristics (BTC) were submitted to the 
European Commission in 2010, and the MBA code 
WTAL is assigned to the future uranium extrac-
tion plant that is constructed as a separate part 
of the mineral processing plant. The production 
of uranium was expected to commence in 2013. 
However, the claims concerning the uranium ex-
traction licence were approved by the Supreme 
Administrative Court in December 2013, and the 
processing of the licence application to extract ura-
nium was returned to the Government. Moreover, 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd filed for bankruptcy in 
November 2014. During 2015 a new state-owned 
company Terrafame took over the mining opera-
tions at Talvivaara. Currently, the use of the ura-
nium extraction plant is not included in the mining 
and mineral processing. However, the MBA code 
WTAL is still kept available for possible future 
nuclear activities.
Other nuclear material holders
There are about ten minor nuclear material hold-
ers in Finland. One of them is an actual mate-
rial balance area: the University of Jyväskylä, 
Department of Physics (JYFL, MBA code WDPJ), 
but in fact the nuclear material at JYFL has 
been derogated and exempted by the European 
Commission and the IAEA. Other minor nuclear 
material holders are members of a Catch-All-MBA 
(CAM), for the purposes of international nuclear 
safeguards. Most of these have depleted uranium 
as radiation-shielding material.
Posiva (MBAs W0LE and W0LF)
Posiva Oy is the company responsible for the dis-
posal of spent nuclear fuel in Finland. It is owned 
by TVO and Fortum. Posiva has been excavat-
ing an underground rock characterisation facility 
called Onkalo at Eurajoki since 2004, and thus 
preparing for the construction of the disposal facil-
ity. In the IAEA safeguards approaches, it has been 
suggested that the geological formation should 
be under safeguards during the whole lifetime of 
the underground facility. For this reason, Posiva 
was required to develop a non-proliferation hand-
book, such as a nuclear materials handbook, to 
describe its safeguards procedures and reporting 
system already before becoming a nuclear mate-
rial holder. By the end of 2012, Posiva submitted 
an application to the Government to construct the 
disposal facility, which will consist of the encap-
sulation plant and the geological repository. The 
licence to construct the disposal facility was grant-
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ed by the Government in November 2015. Based 
on the drawings presented in the application, the 
preliminary BTCs were prepared for both facili-
ties separately and submitted to the Commission 
in June 2013. The MBA codes assigned for the 
future facilities are W0LE for the encapsulation 
plant and W0LF for the geological repository. As 
the geological repository will be under continuous 
development, it has been suggested that the BTC 
for the underground part will be updated annually. 
However, neither Particular Safeguard Provisions 
nor the Facility Attachments of the Safeguards 
Agreement INFCIRC/193 have been prepared for 
these new facilities. The installation without nu-
clear materials but having the two BTCs for these 
future Material Balance Areas constitutes a site 
according to the Additional Protocol. The Posiva 
site (SSFPOS1) covers the fenced area around the 
buildings supporting the construction of the facili-
ties.
Other stakeholders
Nuclear expert organisations, technology holders 
and suppliers that serve nuclear and other indus-
try are obliged to take care that non-proliferation 
sensitive technology does not get into the hands 
of unauthorised actors and thereby contribute 
to nuclear proliferation. The introduction of the 
Additional Protocol (1996) extended the scope of 
safeguards to the non-proliferation control of nu-
clear programmes and fuel cycle-related activities. 
These also include research and development ac-
tivities not involving nuclear materials, but are 
related to process or system development of fuel 
cycle aspects defined in the Protocol. Additionally, 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1540 (April 2004) requires every state to ensure 
that export controls, border controls, material ac-
countancy and physical protection are efficiently 
addressed, and calls all states to develop appropri-
ate ways to work with and inform industry and 
the public regarding their obligations. The control 
of nuclear expert organisations to ensure the non-
proliferation and peaceful use of sensitive technol-
ogy and dual-use items is a growing global chal-
lenge for all stakeholders.
Nuclear safeguards are commonly seen as the 
traditional nuclear material accountancy and re-
porting system, the main stakeholders of which are 
the international, regional and local authorities 
and the operators. In accordance with the extended 
non-proliferation regime and the amendments to 
the Finnish legislation, the stakeholders, universi-
ties, research organisations or companies that have 
activities defined in the Additional Protocol are 
under reporting requirements and export control. 
These stakeholders as users of nuclear energy are 
required to prepare the nuclear safeguards manual 
and to nominate responsible persons for nuclear 
safeguards arrangements.
1.3 IAEA and Euratom 
safeguards in Finland
The IAEA and the EuropeanThe IAEA and the 
European Commission (Euratom safeguards) 
both have independent mandates to operate in 
Finland. These two international inspectorates 
have agreed on cooperation, which aims to reduce 
undue duplication of effort. The operators report 
to the Commission as required by Commission 
Safeguards regulation No 302/2005. It is the 
Commission’s task to audit the licence holders’ ac-
counting and reporting systems. The Commission 
shall draw up the particular safeguard provisions 
(PSP) to agree on the means of safeguards imple-
IAEA regular inspections:
Facilities at nuclear power plants (NPP):
•	 Physical	Inventory	Verification	(PIV)	/	Design	
Information	Verification	(DIV)	1/year
•	 Random	Interim	Inspection	(RII)	at	48	h	 
notification	(at	least	1/year)
Spent fuel storages at NPPs
•	 PIV/DIV	1/year
•	 RII	at	48	h	notification	(at	least	1/year)
Research reactor and locations outside facilities 
(LOF)
•	 PIV/DIV	1/4–6	years
New reactors, under construction
•	 DIV	and	PIV	later	like	at	the	NPPs
Repository (Onkalo), under construction
•	 PIV/DIV	most	likely	1	per	year 
Complementary	accesses	at	2/24	h	notification	to	
verify declared activities or to detect undeclared 
activities.
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mentation taking account of the operational and 
technical constraints of the licence holder.
The IAEA integrated safeguards include tra-
ditional nuclear safeguards as per INFCIRC/193, 
and safeguards activities in accordance with the 
Additional Protocol, fitted together. While this 
should not lead to an increase in inspections, it 
should enable the IAEA to assure itself of the ab-
sence of undeclared nuclear activities in a state. 
In practice, the number of IAEA routine interim 
inspections decreases. In contrast to this, the IAEA 
additionally performs 1–3 short-notice inspections 
per year in a state that has a number and type of 
nuclear installations similar to the situation in 
Finland. The IAEA has annually drawn conclu-
sions confirming its confidence that all nuclear 
activities and materials are accounted for and are 
in peaceful use in Finland.
The number of IAEA and Euratom routine 
inspections decreased significantly in 2009, as 
defined in the state-level safeguards approach 
for Finland, which was negotiated during 2007 
and 2008. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/
STUK) in September 2013, it was agreed that no 
unannounced inspections with two hours’ notice 
time would be performed in Finland after the be-
ginning of 2014. Thus, currently all short notice 
inspections are expected to take place with 48 
hours’ advance notice (see infobox). STUK contin-
ues with annual routines consisting of approxi-
mately 40 field inspections, which enables the 
reduction in the effort of the international in-
spectorates. At the trilateral meeting (IAEA/EC/
STUK) in September 2014, STUK requested the 
IAEA to finalise the Subsidiary Arrangements and 
Facility Attachments of the Safeguards Agreement. 
This is considered to be urgent for the specifica-
tion of inspections procedures. However, the main 
achievement concerning inspection procedures in 
2015 was the agreement to replace the inspection 
announcements sent traditionally by fax by an-
nouncements sent by e-mail. 
According to the Finnish Nuclear Energy 
Act, STUK must be present when the IAEA and 
Euratom are having inspections in Finnish fa-
cilities. Thus STUK has increased preparedness 
for short-notice and unannounced inspections and 
complementary access (abbreviated SNUICA). 
Every weekday, one of STUK’s inspectors is pre-
pared to attend a possible IAEA inspection. 
1.4 Verified declarations for 
state evaluations
A state’s declarations on its nuclear materials and 
activities are the basis for the state evaluation by 
the IAEA under the obligations of the Additional 
Protocol. In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for these declarations to STUK. STUK 
has been nominated a site representative, as per 
European Commission regulation No 302/2005. 
STUK collects, inspects and reviews the relevant 
information and then submits the compiled decla-
rations in timely fashion to the Commission and 
the IAEA.
In Finland, there are currently six sites in the 
sense of the Additional Protocol: the two nuclear 
power plant (NPP) sites in Loviisa and Olkiluoto 
respectively, the geological repository site in 
Olkiluoto, and three minor sites: the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland (VTT), the Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) and the 
Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of 
Helsinki (HYRL). STUK reviews and verifies the 
correctness and completeness of the information 
about the sites provided by the stakeholders.
STUK annually reviews the information about 
research and development activities that might be 
eligible for declaration, as well as activities speci-
fied in Annex I of the Additional Protocol. STUK 
maintains the information on general plans related 
to the nuclear fuel cycle for the next 10 years, and 
keeps an account of the exports of specified equip-
ment and non-nuclear materials, as listed in Annex 
II of the Additional Protocol.
Technical analysis methods are one tool for a 
state nuclear safeguards system to ensure that 
nuclear materials and activities within the state 
are in accordance with the licence holders’ declara-
tions, and that there are no undeclared activities. 
Such methods can provide information on the 
identity of the nuclear materials and confirm that 
licence holders’ declarations are correct and com-
plete with respect to, for example, the enrichment 
of uranium as well as the burn-up and cooling time 
of nuclear fuel. The technical analysis methods in 
use are non-destructive assay (NDA), environmen-
tal sampling and satellite imagery.
STUK employs three NDA methods to verify 
spent nuclear fuel. One method lends itself to rapid 
scanning, as the detector is mounted on the fuel 
transfer machine and the fuel elements can be 
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measured from above the fuel pond without mov-
ing the elements. On the other hand, the other two 
methods allow confirming the correctness of the 
declared burn-up and the cooling time with greater 
confidence. With the most precise method, the ab-
sence of a fuel pin or pins from a fuel element can 
be discovered. STUK reports to the Commission 
and the IAEA about the NDA measurement cam-
paigns.
All nuclear materials leave traces of their iden-
tity, source of origin and treatment. Safeguards en-
vironmental samples (ES) are used to investigate 
these traces, which provide further information for 
establishing whether the nuclear activities are in 
accordance with the declarations. In the Finnish 
nuclear safeguards system, environmental samples 
are collected as surface swipes. The IAEA may col-
lect independent environmental samples during its 
complementary access type of inspections.
Satellite imagery is applied to verify the site 
declaration in accordance with the Additional 
Protocol. Timely imagery is used to monitor dif-
ferent kinds of activities at the sites or elsewhere 
in Finland. STUK contributes to the work of the 
satellite image analysts of the IAEA and the 
Commission.
1.5 Licensing and export/import 
control of dual-use goods
As per the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, other nu-
clear fuel cycle-related activities in addition to 
nuclear materials are under regulatory control. 
A licence is required for the possession, transfer 
and import of non-nuclear materials, components, 
equipment and technology suitable for producing 
nuclear energy (nuclear dual-use items). The list of 
these other items is based on the Nuclear Suppliers’ 
Group (NSG) Guidelines (INFCIRC/254 Part 1). 
The licensing authority is STUK. The Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs is responsible for granting NSG 
Government–to–Government Assurances (GTGA) 
when necessary. The ministry usually consults with 
STUK before giving the assurances. The licence 
holder is required to provide STUK with a list of 
the above-mentioned items annually. Moreover, the 
export, import and transfer of such items must be 
confirmed to STUK after the action.
Mining and mineral processing operations aim-
ing to produce uranium or thorium are also under 
nuclear safeguards and regulatory nuclear safety 
control. In order to carry out these activities, a 
licence and an accounting system to keep track 
of the amounts of uranium and thorium are re-
quired. A national licence is also required to ex-
port and import uranium or thorium ore and ore 
concentrates. These activities are also controlled 
by the Euratom Supply Agency and the European 
Commission. Mining and milling activities as well 
as the production of uranium and thorium must be 
reported to STUK, the Commission and the IAEA. 
Finland’s export control system is based on EU 
Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
2009, which sets up a Community regime for the 
control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit 
of dual-use items. This regulation was amended 
in 2014. The export of Nuclear Suppliers’ Group 
(NSG) Part 1 and Part 2 items is regulated by the 
Finnish Act on the Control of Exports of Dual-
use Goods. An authorisation is required to export 
dual-use items outside the European Union as 
well as for EU internal transfers of NSG Part 1 
items, excluding non-sensitive nuclear materials. 
The licensing authority is the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. Before granting an export licence, it takes 
also care of NSG Government–to–Government 
Assurances. The ministry asks STUK’s opinion on 
all applications concerning NSG Part 1 items.
1.6 The regulatory control of transport 
covers nuclear materials
The requirements for the transport of radioactive 
material are set in the Finnish regulations on the 
transport of dangerous goods. The requirements are 
based on the IAEA Safety Standard Regulations for 
the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, SSR-6, 
and their purpose is to protect people, the environ-
ment and property from the harmful effects of ra-
diation during the transport of radioactive material. 
Based on these regulations, STUK is the competent 
national authority for the regulatory control regard-
ing the transport of radioactive material.
In addition to the dangerous goods transport 
regulations, the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act sets 
specific requirements for the transport of nuclear 
material and nuclear waste: generally a licence 
granted by STUK is needed for such a transport. 
Usually the transport licences are granted for a 
fixed period, typically for a few years. A transport 
plan and a transport security plan approved by 
STUK are mandatory for each transport of nuclear 
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material or nuclear waste. A certificate of nuclear 
liability insurance must also be delivered to STUK 
before transportation. Furthermore, a package may 
be used for the transport of fissile nuclear material 
only after the package design has been approved by 
STUK.
1.7 STUK’s contribution to international 
safeguards development
Nuclear non-proliferation is, by its nature, an in-
ternational domain. STUK therefore actively par-
ticipates in international nuclear safeguards-relat-
ed cooperation and development efforts. The prac-
tices obtained at the current construction projects 
in Olkiluoto have emphasised the need to bring in 
the safeguards requirements at an early stage of 
facility design. In order to improve and facilitate 
the future implementation of safeguards at new fa-
cilities, STUK initiated negotiations with all stake-
holders to have the 3S (safety, security, safeguards) 
concept included in the design requirements of new 
facilities. The experience has been shared with the 
IAEA, several international fora and also in bilat-
eral cooperation with several countries.
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to its commit-
tees and most of the working groups. STUK partic-
ipates in the ESARDA Executive Board meetings 
and in several working groups.
Upon request by the IAEA, STUK’s experts 
have contributed to the IAEA’s international mis-
sions. The current experience obtained from the 
planning, design and construction of new nuclear 
facilities in Finland has increased the number of 
requests to participate in different kinds of inter-
national cooperation. 
STUK keeps close contacts with the respective 
Nordic authority organisations. The development 
of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel in geological 
repositories is strengthening cooperation between 
Finland and Sweden.
The Finnish Safeguards Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards, FINSP, was established 
in 1988. The aim of FINSP is to provide the IAEA 
with educational and technical support in the field 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. FINSP is 
funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and im-
plemented by STUK.
In 2014 the partnership programme between 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
and STUK was launched. The initiative is to give 
expert support to the establishment of the nuclear 
regulatory authority in Saudi Arabia. In the field 
of safeguards and nuclear security, STUK’s safe-
guards and security experts carry out practical 
cooperation with their colleagues at K.A.CARE.
1.8 The Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) is an important part of the international 
regime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weap-
ons. The CTBT bans any nuclear test explosions in 
any environment. This ban is aimed at constrain-
ing the development and the qualitative improve-
ment of nuclear weapons, including the develop-
ment of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on 24 September 1996. It will en-
ter into force after it has been ratified by the 44 
states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states par-
ticipated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament and possess nuclear power or 
research reactors. 
A global verification regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The verification regime consists of the following 
elements: the International Monitoring System 
(IMS), a consultation and clarification process, 
on-site inspections and confidence-building meas-
ures. The IMS is almost 90% ready, and is pro-
viding data from almost 300 measuring stations 
all over the world to more than 1,200 organisa-
tions in more than 120 countries. In addition 
to monitoring compliance with the treaty, the 
data from the IMS is used in disaster mitiga-
tion. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO) is actively providing data 
to the global Tsunami Warning System and, since 
2012, the CTBTO has been a member of the Inter-
Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear 
Emergencies (IACRNE) and a co-sponsor of the 
Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan of 
the International Organisations (JPLAN) led by 
the IAEA. Within this framework, the CTBTO is 
STUK-B 200
21
responsible for gathering and providing close to re-
al-time radionuclide monitoring data to the IAEA 
and other participating organisations. 
Finland signed the CTBT on its day of opening 
in 1996 and ratified it less than three years later. 
In addition to complying with the basic require-
ment of the CTBT of not carrying out any nuclear 
weapons tests, Finland actively takes part in the 
development of the verification regime.
In the CTBT framework, the Finnish national 
authority is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK 
has two roles: it operates the Finnish National 
Data Centre (FiNDC) and one of the 16 radionu-
clide laboratories in the IMS (RL07). The most 
important task of the FiNDC is to inspect data re-
ceived from IMS and inform the national authority 
about any indications of a nuclear test explosion. 
The radionuclide laboratory contributes to the IMS 
by providing support in the radionuclide analyses 
and in the quality control of the radionuclide sta-
tion network. The third major national collaborator 
is the Institute of Seismology at the University of 
Helsinki, which runs an IMS seismology station 
(PS17 in Lahti) and provides analysis of waveform 
IMS data (Figure 4).
1.9 Interfaces between nuclear 
safeguards and security 
STUK is the national authority for the regulatory 
control of nuclear and radiological safety, security 
and safeguards (3S). All these three regimes have 
a common goal: the protection of people, society, 
the environment and future generations from the 
harmful effects of ionising radiation. As nuclear 
security aims to protect nuclear facilities, nuclear 
material and other radioactive material from un-
lawful activities, it is clear that the majority of the 
activities that aim at non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, nuclear materials and sensitive nuclear 
technology contribute to nuclear security. Physical 
and information security measures at nuclear fa-
cilities and for nuclear materials including technol-
ogy, sensitive information and knowledge also con-
tribute to non-proliferation by providing detection 
and delay of and response to security events. On 
the other hand, nuclear material accountancy and 
control measures may supplement security meas-
ures through a deterrence effect. 
The Finnish regulatory system for nuclear se-
curity was audited by an IPPAS mission in 2009, 
followed by an IPPAS follow-up mission in 2012. 
One of the recommendations arising from the au-
dit – namely, the need for more detailed security 
requirements for minor holders of nuclear materi-
als – was part of the Nuclear Materials Section’s 
area of responsibility. As a result, the new STUK 
requirements set in the Guide YVL D.1 on regula-
tory control of nuclear safeguards contain more 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
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National Data Centre (FiNDC)
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Institute of Seismology
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Figure 4. The Finnish CTBT organisation.
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detailed security requirements for these minor 
holders. The Guide YVL D.1 complements Guides 
YVL A.11 Security of a Nuclear Facility and A.12 
Information Security Management of a Nuclear 
Facility. STUK safeguards and security sections 
are working in close cooperation to set detailed re-
quirements for all the users of nuclear energy and 
to verify that requirements are complied. This en-
sures that both safeguards and security in all use 
of nuclear energy are taken care of as well as pos-
sible and national and international requirements 
can be fulfilled. In 2014, STUK created a new 
assessment type for 3S approach, called site walk, 
where inspectors for safety, security and safe-
guards jointly review licence holder’s processes and 
practices. Furthermore, in 2015 STUK launched 
the GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards and 
Security) project for the harmonisation of safety, 
information security and other security arrange-
ments and the safeguards for the implementation 
of 3S in an appropriate manner. 
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2 Themes of 2015
2.1 Enforcement of STUK requirements
The need for the revision of STUK requirements 
was recognised when applying the existing reg-
ulations to the construction of the new reactor, 
Olkiluoto 3. During the reformation work, the in-
ternational reviews and stress tests performed 
after the Fukushima accidents were also taken 
into account. The nuclear safeguards require-
ments were addressed, mainly stemming from the 
Olkiluoto 3 and later also from the Olkiluoto 4 and 
Hanhikivi 1 experiences, by fitting the safeguards, 
security and safety interfaces of a new nuclear 
facility into the bidding phase. The revised STUK 
requirements were published as new YVL Guides 
in 2013. In general the publication of an YVL guide 
shall not, as such, alter any previous decisions 
made by STUK. However, after hearing of the par-
ties concerned STUK issues separate implemen-
tation decisions as to how a new or revised YVL 
guide is to be applied to operating nuclear facili-
ties or those under construction, and to the licence 
holder’s operational activities. In particular, the 
regulatory guide YVL D.1 for nuclear safeguards 
shall apply as it stands to new nuclear facilities 
and to other use of nuclear energy. 
The main safeguards requirement is to describe 
the operator’s nuclear material accountancy and 
control system in nuclear materials manual and 
also to describe the necessary security measures 
(including information security) in a separate doc-
ument (security plan) annexed to the safeguards 
manual. This nuclear material manual and secu-
rity plan shall be submitted to STUK for approval. 
This requirement was also adapted to those users 
of nuclear energy who are performing research and 
development activities referred to in the Additional 
Protocol. During 2015 STUK assessed these safe-
guards manuals and security plans. The aim that 
all users of nuclear energy are acting in accord-
ance with an approved manual by the end of the 
year 2015 was almost achieved. At the end of the 
year, one manual of a new stakeholder was in the 
approval process and one manual was under up-
dating.
Moreover, operators of the operating nuclear 
facilities were requested to carry out a self-assess-
ment on how the STUK requirement published in 
the YVL guides can be fulfilled. In this context also 
the YVL D.1 requirements were self-assessed dur-
ing 2014–2015. None of the facility operators ap-
plied for a deviation from the requirements. STUK 
reviewed and assessed the operators applications 
and made implementation decisions on the imple-
mentation practices at TVO’s Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
reactors, spent fuel storage and low and intermedi-
ate level waste repository, to the Fortum’s Loviisa 
NPP, and on the VTT FiR1 research reactor. In the 
implementation decision for TVO, STUK approved 
that TVO can comply YVL D.1 requirements also 
at the Olkiluoto 3 reactor which is under construc-
tion although separate implementation decision 
will be made accordingly later. In all these deci-
sions some updates for the nuclear materials man-
ual were required. The implementation of the new 
Guide YVL D.1 as such began in March 2015 for 
TVO, in October 2015 for Fortum, and in January 
2016 for VTT.
2.2 Safeguards-by-Design for 
the encapsulation plant
After the submission of the nuclear construction li-
cence application for the disposal facility for spent 
nuclear fuel in 2012, several meetings were ar-
ranged between Posiva, STUK, the Commission 
and the IAEA, in order to clarify and facilitate 
safeguards measures for the permanent disposal 
of spent nuclear fuel. The meetings in 2013–2015 
focused on the verification issues prior to spent 
fuel encapsulation and the on the technical safe-
guards measures for the encapsulation process. 
24
STUK-B 200
The requirement document for the IAEA/EC equip-
ment to be installed in the encapsulation plant 
was prepared and finalised in 2014. This require-
ment document was indicated in the STUK assess-
ment of the licence application in February 2015. 
The construction licence for the new facility was 
granted by the Government on 12 November 2015. 
The licence gives Posiva authorisation to construct 
the encapsulation plant, deposition tunnels, depo-
sition holes and other necessary installations for 
the geological repository. According to the licence 
conditions construction shall start within two 
years. STUK’s oversight of the encapsulation plant 
and geological repository is continuous through the 
construction phase and operation of the facility. 
Posiva is expected to apply for an operating licence 
for the facility in the early 2020’s.
Parallel to this, a task force consisting of the 
IAEA, the Commission and Finnish and Swedish 
authorities and operators was established in 
November 2012. The first Lower Level Liaison 
Committee (LLLC) Encapsulation Plant and 
Geological Repository (EPGR) Liaison Group meet-
ing was arranged in January 2013 to discuss the 
draft versions for Basic Technical Characteristics 
of the encapsulation plant and for the geological 
repository. The Committee did not meet officially 
during 2015, but the IAEA and the Commission 
representatives commented on the preparation of 
the BTC documents for the disposal facility dur-
ing 2013–2015. In the meanwhile, Posiva updated 
the BTC’s both for the encapsulation plant and the 
geological repository in May 2015. In particular, 
the layout of the planned encapsulation plant was 
updated. As a consequence, the requirement docu-
ment for the safeguards equipment to be installed 
at the encapsulation plant has to be updated by 
the IAEA and the Commission as an interactive 
“Safeguards-by-Design” process. 
During 2015, two videoconferences and one 
technical meeting at Posiva premises in Vuojoki 
were held between the inspectorates and the 
Finnish operators and regulators. In these meet-
ings the equipment infrastructure requirements 
specification for the encapsulation plant operator 
in Finland was discussed and adjusted, to facilitate 
effective safeguards with minimal impact on the 
design and operation of the encapsulation plant. 
Another major discussion point was the plans for 
the NDA measurements needed to verify the spent 
fuel before permanent  deposition and the impact 
of such measurements on the operation of the cur-
rent spent fuel storages at the NPP’s. In spite of 
the fact that the encapsulation plant will not be in 
operation before 2022, a draft safeguards approach 
document should be created by the IAEA and the 
Commission in the near future. At the same time 
work on the Particular Safeguard Provisions and 
Facility Attachment should commence. The first 
official draft Facility Attachment was provided 
by the IAEA to the Commission in October 2015. 
The Commission will start negotiations with the 
Agency after review. The work on developing a 
similar safeguards infrastructure specification for 
the geological repository will continue in the com-
ing years.
2.3 GOSSER – 3S for disposal 
of spent fuel 
The disposal of spent fuel requires that safety, data 
security and other security arrangements and the 
safeguards required to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons are properly implemented. This 
requires the reconciliation of all areas resulting in 
the implementation of 3S in an appropriate man-
ner. This, in turn, requires actions from the opera-
tors producing, encapsulating or disposing of spent 
nuclear fuel (TVO, Fortum, Posiva) as well as the 
authorities (STUK). 
The GOSSER (Geological Disposal Safeguards 
and Security) project is STUK’s development pro-
ject, which main objective is the finalisation of the 
Finnish concept for safeguarding the geological 
disposal of the spent nuclear fuel. The GOSSER 
gathers together the needed actions that have 
been done and that still need to be done to de-
velop the cost effective and functional safeguards 
concepts for the encapsulation plant and for the 
geological repository. The project coordinates the 
activities between the IAEA Safeguards Support 
Programme, the safeguards implementation plans 
of the IAEA, the European Commission and STUK, 
and maintains the cooperation between STUK’s 
safety, security and safeguards sections.
GOSSER contains two important sub-projects. 
First and more toilsome is LOVE (verification of 
the spent fuel for the disposal), which activities 
are aimed to develop the robust, reliable and ac-
curate method and device that enables creation 
of the necessary assurance that spent fuel to be 
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Figure 5. The organisational structure of GICNT.
disposed is what it is stated to be. Second and 
more far-reaching is JOY (continuity, observation, 
co-operation and synergies), which concentrates 
to ensure completeness and correctness of infor-
mation in a manner that continuity-of-knowledge 
(C-o-K) are preserved also after the closure of the 
geological repository. In JOY, the technologies and 
methods for observation of activities are assessed 
and if found necessary developed. It’s aim is also to 
utilise findings of safety and security to fulfil safe-
guards objectives as well as create surplus value 
that increase confidence that disposal of spent fuel 
is possible to be done safe and secured, i.e. one task 
is to seek and exploit synergies between different 
regimes by strengthening the co-operation and ex-
change of information.  
The GOSSER project was approved in December 
2015 and it is expected to be finished by the end of 
the 2018.
2.4 GICNT – Global Initiative to Combat 
Nuclear Terrorism in Helsinki 2015
The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, 
founded in 2006, is a voluntary partnership of 86 
nations, 5 official observers, and co-chaired by the 
Russian Federation and the United States. A struc-
ture of the GICNT is presented in Figure 5. The 
GICNT mission is to strengthen the global capac-
ity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear ter-
rorism by conducting multilateral activities that 
strengthen the plans, policies, procedures, and 
interoperability of partner nations. The GICNT 
plenary meetings are organised every two years. 
In these meetings the work programme for the 
coming two years is agreed. The previous plenary 
meeting was organised at Helsinki in June 2015. 
During the Helsinki plenary meeting also new 
chairmen for the Implementation and Assessment 
Group (IAG) and for the NDWG were endorsed. 
The Netherlands was assigned to chair the IAG 
and Finland to chair the NDWG. In January 2015 
the Nuclear Detection Working Group (NDW
The Leadership Team of GICNT includes co-
chairs, chairmen of different groups and a couple 
of distinguished experts. During the autumn 2015 
Leadership Team has converted the general work 
plan agreed in the plenary meeting to a more 
concrete plan. During 2015 in addition to GICNT 
events organised in Finland, Finnish experts have 
also participated in Leadership Team meetings 
abroad and in exercises in Karlsruhe, the Hague 
and London. 
2.5 IPNDV – International 
Partnership for Nuclear 
Disarmament Verification
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarma-
ment Verification (IPNDV) was established on the 
initiative of United States in 2014. IPNDV’s first 
plenary meeting was organised in Washington DC 
in March 2015. The main outcome of the meeting 
was the establishment of three working groups:
1) Monitoring and Verification Objectives
2) On-site Inspections
3) Technical Challenges and Solutions.
Finland participates in the work of all groups. In 
November 2015 the second plenary meeting was 
organised in Oslo, Norway. It was agreed that dur-
ing the next 18 months IPNDV will concentrate 
on the verification of the disassembly of nuclear 
weapons. Some countries criticised this decision 
since in their opinion the disassembly of a weapon 
does not remove it from the arsenal permanently. 
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This critique was responded to by saying that later 
on IPNDV will also include other parts of the nu-
clear weapons’ life cycle. The first concrete results 
are expected before the end of the 18 month period. 
This should be a realistic expectation due to the 
tight focus of the work. 
Before IPNDV nuclear disarmament activi-
ties have mainly been bilateral. Only Russian 
Federation and the United States have actual 
past experience on this topic. In IPNDV special 
emphasises needs to be given to the non-prolifer-
ation issues due to the participation of multiple 
non-nuclear weapon states. Two different techno-
logical approaches are investigated: Template and 
Attribute methods. During the Oslo meeting it was 
agreed that participants should first publish their 
results and only after that introduce them to the 
IPNDV forum. 
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3 Safeguards activities in 2015
3.1 The regulatory control of 
nuclear materials
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures as in the past. Nuclear material inventories 
at the end of 2015 are shown in Tables A2 and A3 
in Appendix 1. The development of inspections and 
inspection person days per Material Balance Area 
(MBA) is presented in Figures 6 and 7. Inspections 
by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and the European Commission in 2015 are 
presented in Appendix 2.
The application of integrated safeguards began 
in Finland on 15 October 2008. Thus, in 2009 the 
number of IAEA inspections was reduced from 
approximately 30 person days to 15. Similarly, 
the Commission reduced its inspection activities 
significantly. In 2010, the number of inspection 
days rose somewhat, due to the first inspections at 
the geological repository site, additional inspection 
days at the Loviisa Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), 
and the increased number of random inspections 
in Finland. Since 2010, the number of regular in-
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spections has remained at the same level, i.e. the 
current number of annual IAEA inspection days 
is about 25 person days in Finland. In 2014, the 
IAEA and the Commission carried out an exten-
sive inspection in the planned geological reposi-
tory. During the one-week long survey campaign 
in Onkalo, 65 person days ware spent by the in-
spectors, technicians and supporting JRC staff. A 
similar inspection was performed also in 2015; and, 
24 person days were spent to inspect the planned 
facility. Only the inspector days are estimated in 
the figures.
3.1.1 Declarations and approvals of 
new international inspectors
All the relevant licence holders sent their updated 
information for the national declaration, which is 
compiled by STUK, in time by 1 April. STUK sub-
mitted Finland’s annual declaration updates to the 
IAEA on 13 May 2015 as required. Additionally, 
STUK submitted the quarterly declarations on ex-
ports in February, May, August and November.
In 2015, altogether 37 IAEA and 7 Commission 
inspectors, newly appointed, were approved to per-
form inspections at nuclear facilities in Finland.
3.1.2 The Loviisa nuclear power plant site
During 2015 the operator Fortum self-assessed 
how the STUK requirements in Guide YVL D.1are 
and can be fulfilled at the Loviisa NPP, and applied 
for the implementation decision. STUK made the 
implementation decision on YVL D.1 for Loviisa 
NPP on 25 September 2015. The regulatory guide 
YVL D.1 is in force for the Loviisa NPP since 1 
October 2015.
In total, STUK performed 12 safeguards in-
spections at the Loviisa NPP in 2015. The routine 
refuelling outage of the Loviisa 1 reactor unit took 
place during the period 9–26 August 2015 and the 
outage of the Loviisa 2 reactor unit during the 
period 29 August – 15 September 2015. STUK, the 
IAEA and the Commission performed a Physical 
Inventory Taking (pre-PIT) inspection before the 
outages, on 5–6 July 2015. Due to working re-
mote data transmission, no extra cameras were 
needed during the outages. The Physical Inventory 
Verification (PIV) was carried out after the out-
age, on 22–23 September 2015. STUK identified 
the fuel assemblies in the reactor cores and item-
counted the fuel assemblies in the loading ponds. 
The Loviisa 1 core was inspected on 16 August 
2015 and the Loviisa 2 core on 5 September 2015. 
In addition to the PIV and the core controls, STUK 
carried out two routine inspections on its own. Two 
additional inspections, together with the IAEA 
and the Commission were carried out to perform 
activities, that the international inspectors did not 
perform on the pre- and post PIV inspections, these 
two inspections could be scheduled with minimal 
resource use, while the inspectors were present at 
the NPP for other reasons. 
On the basis of its own assessment as well as 
that of the IAEA and the Commission inspection 
results, STUK concluded that Fortum’s Loviisa 
NPP complied with its nuclear safeguards obliga-
tions in 2015. 
3.1.3 The Olkiluoto nuclear power plant site
In 2015, STUK granted two import licences to TVO 
for importing fresh nuclear fuel. 
The operator TVO self-assessed in 2014 the YVL 
D.1 requirements and how these can be fulfilled at 
the facilities, and applied for the implementation 
decision. STUK made the implementation deci-
sion on YVL D.1 on 13 March 2015 for Olkiluoto 
operating nuclear facilities. In the decision STUK 
also approved that in Olkiluoto 3 facility under 
construction YVL D.1 can be used as a substitutive 
procedure until the actual implementation decision 
will be made. The regulatory guide YVL D.1 is in 
force for the Olkiluoto operating facilities since 15 
March 2015.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of the 
Olkiluoto 1 reactor unit took place during the 
period 30 April – 12 May 2015, and that of the 
Olkiluoto 2 reactor unit during the period 15 May 
– 2 June 2015. The PIV was carried out after the 
outage on 23–24 June 2015 in the two reactor units 
and the spent fuel storage.
During the refuelling and maintenance outage, 
STUK identified the fuel assemblies in the reactor 
cores and inspected the loading ponds before the 
reactors were closed. The Olkiluoto 1 reactor was 
inspected on 10 May 2015 and the Olkiluoto 2 reac-
tor on 1 June 2015.
STUK carried out two additional routine in-
spections at the Olkiluoto site and the material 
balance areas (MBA) at the Olkiluoto NPP. In the 
spent fuel storage, the ponds are covered with 
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shielding plates preventing regular verification 
activities for the fuel elements in the ponds.
The annual design information verification in-
spection in the Olkiluoto 3 unit was carried out 
on 10 November 2015. The MBA code W0L4 was 
assigned to Olkiluoto 4 unit already in 2013. 
However, TVO decided in June 2015 that no con-
struction licence for Olkiluoto 4 will be applied 
for during the 5-year period of validity of the 
Decision-in-Principle. Consequently, the Decision-
in-Principle expired in June 2015. TVO informed 
the European Commission about the changed situ-
ation by sending an update of the preliminary basic 
technical characteristics. The IAEA was informed 
as well, by STUK letter explaining the situation 
so that the IAEA has the required information to 
refrain from planning any safeguards activities for 
Olkiluoto 4.
On the basis of its own assessment and on 
the IAEA and the Commission inspection results, 
STUK concluded that TVO’s Olkiluoto NPP com-
plied with its nuclear safeguards obligations in 
2015.
3.1.4 The Hanhikivi nuclear 
power plant project
The Government granted a Decision-in-Principle 
in 2010 for the new operator Fennovoima to con-
struct a new nuclear power plant at a new site. 
STUK initiated negotiations with the operators 
and the Commission as well as with the IAEA in 
2011 to prepare for the implementation of safe-
guards in good time, simultaneously with the facil-
ity development. As a consequence, the company 
could request the vendor organisations to facili-
tate safeguards implementation; for example, to 
improve proliferation resistance and facilitate nu-
clear material verification and surveillance at the 
future plant. In the meantime, Fennovoima created 
an organisation for safeguards and prepared for 
the implementation of safeguards. 
The re-assessment of the already approved ap-
plication began in 2013 for technical and organi-
sational changes since the Decision-in-Principle 
because the option of having Rosatom as a vendor 
candidate was not included in the application rati-
fied in 2010. On 5 December 2014, the Parliament 
endorsed the Decision-in-Principle of 2010 for the 
new reactor type with a requirement for reasona-
ble domestic ownership. Owing to this, the nuclear 
construction licence application was submitted on 
30 June 2015 in accordance with the 5-year time-
line set in 2010. In addition to the licence applica-
tion documents, Fennovoima submitted to STUK 
the material identified in the § 35 of the Nuclear 
Energy Decree. This included ‘A plan for arranging 
the safeguards control that is necessary to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons’ as stated in 
the Decree. The process of reviewing and assessing 
the application documents for the statements was 
launched by the Ministry of Employment and the 
Economy in September 2015 with the aim to have 
STUK statement and safety assessment finalised 
by the end of 2017, if possible. The procedures to 
complete the statement on Fennovoima’s plan for 
arranging the safeguards were discussed between 
STUK and Fennovoima in October 2015.
One of the first steps in the construction pro-
cess is the control of nuclear technology, such as 
sensitive information obtained from the bidding 
companies. It was obvious that the first version of 
the nuclear materials handbook should focus on 
the current needs to control the nuclear technology 
and dual-use equipment. Thus, STUK approved 
Fennovoima’s safeguards manual “Fennovoima 
Managements System: Nuclear Materials Manual” 
in July 2014. Fennovoima submitted an annual 
safeguards report to STUK and the programme 
of activities for 2015–2016 to STUK and the 
Commission. The preliminary design information 
was updated in July 2015.
Based on the meetings on the implementation 
of safeguards and the control of nuclear tech-
nology with Fennovoima’s staff, STUK concludes 
that awareness and preparedness for safeguards 
procedures are at an adequate level in the new or-
ganisation preparing for the new NPP project and 
Fennovoima fulfilled its safeguards obligations in 
2015.
3.1.5 The VTT FiR1 research reactor site
In 2015, the preparations for decommissioning the 
research reactor and those for the construction of 
the new nuclear safety research building contin-
ued at the Technical Research Centre of Finland, 
VTT. STUK reviewed the decommissioning plans 
and made its assessment to VTT in May. The reac-
tor was shut down permanently on 30 June 2015 
and made subcritical on 7 December 2015. The 
operating licence amendment application for de-
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commissioning will be prepared during 2016. In 
2015, STUK approved one person as a deputy for 
the safeguards responsible person. An internal co-
ordinative project was launched at STUK for the 
control of the decommission projects at the build-
ing containing the laboratories and the research 
rector as well as for the commissioning of the new 
experimental premises.
STUK and VTT responsible persons met twice 
and discussed future actions to ensure appro-
priate safeguards procedures. The update of the 
BTC for the reactor and the preliminary BTC for 
the new building of the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety under construction were submitted to the 
Commission at the end of 2014. The small amounts 
of nuclear material used in the laboratories located 
in the reactor building will be moved to the new 
building once it is commissioned. The current tar-
get is at the beginning of 2016. In the beginning 
of 2015, the Commission assigned the Material 
Balance Area code WNSC for the new building. The 
aim is to have separate MBAs for the two separate 
VTT buildings with different activities. The site 
delimited according to the Additional Protocol cov-
ers only the reactor building. The VTT site will 
updated as the materials and activities are moved 
to new locations in the near future. In addition, 
VTT prepared a separate safeguards manual to 
cover the responsibilities to report and control the 
research and development activities defined in the 
Additional Protocol. These activities are carried 
out in several buildings in the research campus 
area in Espoo. In 2015 STUK approved this safe-
guards manual.
During 2015 STUK made decisions on the im-
plementation practices of the regulatory guides 
on nuclear safety. In this context the applicabil-
ity of the regulatory guide YVL D.1 on nuclear 
safeguards was assessed for the operator of the 
research reactor. As the outcome, the requirement 
to revise and update the safeguards handbook was 
set. The requirements of the regulatory guide YVL 
D.1 enter in force in 1 January 2016 for the opera-
tor of the research reactor.
In 2015, STUK carried out one interim inspec-
tion at the research reactor site of VTT. On 27 
March, the site declaration and, in particular, the 
progress in construction activities and plans to 
move materials and activities to the new building, 
were checked. STUK and the Commission veri-
fied the nuclear material inventory of VTT on 24 
September 2015. The construction site for the VTT 
Centre for Nuclear Safety was also visited during 
the inspection. 
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that VTT complied with 
its nuclear safeguards obligations in 2015.
3.1.6 STUK site
STUK Nuclear Materials Section verified the phys-
ical inventory, and inspected the site declaration 
and basic technical characteristics during the in-
spection on 11 June 2015. Also, the new safeguards 
manual was addressed and finally it was approved 
with a few remarks concerning the responsibilities 
and the need to update the quality management 
system in general. Anyhow, it can be concluded 
that the operating unit at STUK fulfils the require-
ments for national safeguards arrangements. 
3.1.7 University of Helsinki site
STUK carried out its inspection to the University 
of Helsinki site on 21 April 2015 to verify the site 
declaration and the inventory. The inspections was 
accompanied also by inspectors from the Radiation 
Practices and Nuclear Security of STUK to verify 
the 3S practices at the University as described in 
the nuclear material handbook prepared in June 
2014. The manual covers the control and reporting 
procedures for nuclear materials. Also the proce-
dures for reporting the research and development 
activities as defined in the Additional Protocol 
were added to the handbook. The handbook was 
finally approved in June 2015.
On the basis of its assessment and inspection 
results, STUK concluded that the University of 
Helsinki complied with its nuclear safeguards obli-
gations in 2015.
3.1.8 Minor nuclear material holders
In 2015, STUK inspected the reports from the mi-
nor nuclear material holders. In addition, STUK 
granted the licence to the Geological Survey of 
Finland to possess, handle, use and store nuclear 
materials in order to continue their activities. One 
minor holder reported termination of possession of 
nuclear material. 
The minor holders were requested to prepare 
their nuclear materials handbooks as required 
in the new STUK requirements, i.e. in the Guide 
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YVL D.1. These handbooks or manuals were pre-
pared during 2014, but the approval process con-
tinued in 2015. In total 13 handbooks were sub-
mitted to STUK by the minor holders, but some 
activities and materials were withdrawn after the 
submission of preliminary handbooks. In total, 8 
handbooks prepared by the minor holders were ap-
proved in 2015.
On the basis of its assessment, STUK concluded 
that the minor nuclear material holders complied 
with their nuclear safeguards obligations in 2015.
3.1.9 Front-end fuel cycle operators
The operators at Harjavalta and Kokkola report 
monthly to the Commission and STUK. The extrac-
tion of uranium from industrial purification pro-
cesses is considered to be a pre-safeguard activity 
and therefore not subject to IAEA safeguards. With 
the entry into force of Guide YVL D.1 imminent, 
the operators are preparing their procedures to ful-
fil the new requirements. In particular, the nucle-
ar safeguards manual are to be incorporated into 
the quality managements systems. During 2015, 
STUK approved the manuals prepared by Norilsk 
Nickel Harjavalta and Freeport Kokkola. On the 
basis of its assessment, STUK concluded that these 
operators complied with their nuclear safeguards 
obligations in 2015.
During early 2011, STUK evaluated the li-
cence application of Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd to 
begin uranium production as a by-product at 
the Talvivaara nickel mine. On 1 March 2012, 
the Finnish Government granted a licence in ac-
cordance with the Finnish nuclear legislation to 
Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd for the extraction of ura-
nium from the Talvivaara mine. According to the 
licence conditions, STUK must ensure that all rel-
evant arrangements are in place, including the nu-
clear safeguards manual and responsible persons 
for nuclear materials accountancy before the plant 
is commissioned. During 2011–2013, the uranium 
extraction plant was built as a new unit in the 
mineral processing complex. Progress in uranium 
extraction was halted on 5 December 2013 when 
the Supreme Administrative Court revoked the 
licence of 1 March 2012 to extract uranium for re-
assessment by the Finnish Government. Moreover, 
during 2014 the Talvivaara Sotkamo Ltd. contin-
ued for restructuring and finally filed for bank-
ruptcy on 6 November 2014. On 12 March 2015 
the Ministry of Employment and the Economy 
announced new financing and new ownership for 
the mine. Furthermore, in August 2015 the state-
owned company Terrafame Mining Oy took over 
the mining and milling operations of Talvivaara 
Sotkamo Ltd. There were no safeguards activities 
at Talvivaara in 2015.
3.1.10 The disposal facility site 
for spent nuclear fuel
The operator Posiva applied for the nuclear con-
struction application for the disposal facility in 
2012. STUK assessed the application during 
2013–2015 together with the Commission and the 
IAEA in order to clarify and facilitate safeguards 
measures for the permanent disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel. The requirement document for the 
IAEA/EC equipment to be installed in the encap-
sulation plant was prepared and finalised in 2014. 
This requirement document was referenced in the 
STUK assessment of the licence application on 12 
February 2015. The construction licence for the 
new facility was granted by the Government on 12 
November 2015.
In May 2015 Posiva updated the BTCs both for 
the encapsulation plant and the geological reposi-
tory. In particular, the layout of the encapsulation 
plant was updated. In the geological repository 
there where no actual changes in the underground 
premises, but the planned shaft connections were 
presented more precisely to assist the planning 
of safeguards measures. As a consequence, the re-
quirement document for the safeguards equipment 
to be installed at the encapsulation plant had to 
be updated by the IAEA and the Commission. This 
“Safeguards-by-Design” process can be expected to 
continue during the progress of the facility. 
During 10–12 November 2015 two survey 
teams consisting of the Commission, JRC/Ispra 
and the IAEA inspector and technicians indepen-
dently inspected the underground premises using 
laser scanning devices. All teams were escorted 
by operator’s staff. In their on-site assessment, 
the underground premises were confirmed to cor-
respond to the drawings that were available at the 
construction site. Owing to the security-relevant 
nature of the detailed information, all the data col-
lected and drawings inspected were left in several 
sealed copies at the site. 
Posiva updated its safeguards manual in spring 
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2015 mainly to correspond to organisational chang-
es and current safeguards practices. The number 
of appendices was increased to cover safeguards-
related activities and also the name was changed 
from safeguards manual to nuclear materials 
handbook owing to the to foreseen control of nu-
clear materials. During 2015, STUK approved the 
manual update. As a consequence of the construc-
tion licence application, STUK approved the re-
sponsible manager and his deputy for the construc-
tion of the disposal facility.
In 2015 STUK carried out two interim inspec-
tions at the site. As the there were almost no un-
derground excavation works going on during the 
processing of the licence application, the STUK 
inspections were focused on the site declaration, 
3S site walk concepts and research activities. On 
the basis of its assessment and inspection results, 
STUK concluded that Posiva complied with its nu-
clear safeguards obligations in 2015.
3.1.11 Verification of spent fuel
In August 2015 STUK performed a Gamma burn-
up verification (GBUV) measurement campaign at 
the Olkiluoto NPP unit 2. During the campaign, 
50 fuel elements were measured and verified as 
spent fuel. In November STUK performed FORK 
measurements at the Loviisa spent fuel pond. The 
neutron detection unit of the fork device did not 
function, but 20 fuel units and one dummy element 
were verified using gross gamma measurements 
only. The dummy element was a skeleton element 
that had been inserted in the reactor between 2011 
and 2013. Because of its high activation and short 
cooling period the skeleton device could not be dis-
tinguished from long cooled fuel elements by gross 
gamma measurements only, but it was clearly dis-
tinguishable from fuel elements of similar age.
3.1.12 Nuclear dual-use items, export licences
In 2015, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs issued 
12 export licences for NSG Part 1 items: one indi-
vidual licence for nuclear material and three for 
components to the EU countries, three individual 
licences and for exporting nuclear technology (nu-
clear information) for a nuclear power plant to the 
EU countries, four licences to export software to 
Sweden (3) and the Russian Federation and train-
ing of nuclear software to the representatives of 
the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia.
3.1.13 Transport of nuclear materials 
and nuclear waste
In 2015, fresh nuclear fuel was imported to Finland 
from Germany, Sweden and the Russian Federation 
(Appendix 1, Table A1). In relation to these im-
ports, STUK approved four transport plans and 
two transport packaging designs. 
STUK inspected fresh nuclear fuel transports 
in accordance with the inspection plan, i.e. one in-
spection was carried out in 2015. 
3.1.14 International transfers of 
nuclear material
In 2015, TVO reported to STUK about its interna-
tional fuel contracts, fuel transfers and fuel ship-
ments. Based on the document inspection findings, 
STUK concluded that TVO has complied with its 
safeguards obligations when purchasing the nu-
clear fuel and managing its international nuclear 
material transfers. The other operators purchase 
fuel as an end-product, and thus their accountancy 
does not need to cover the purchase chain abroad.
3.1.15 Other stakeholders 
In 2015, STUK granted two licences to expert 
organisations to possess and transfer nuclear 
technology (nuclear information) related to the 
Fennovoima project. 
Research organisations and universities that 
perform research and development work defined 
in the Additional Protocol were requested to nomi-
nate their responsible persons and prepare a safe-
guards manual in 2014. Since the work does not 
need a licence, these contact persons were not 
officially approved by STUK. The approval of the 
manuals of four stakeholders took place in the be-
ginning of 2015. 
3.2 The Finnish National Data 
Centre for the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
3.2.1 International cooperation is the 
foundation of CTBT verification
During 2015, the Finnish National Data Centre 
(FiNDC) participated in meetings of the Working 
Group B (WGB) of the Preparatory Commission 
for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization (CTBTO). WGB is a policy-making 
organ for the technical development of the veri-
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fication regime. By participating in the work of 
WGB and its subsidiaries (workshops and expert 
groups), the FiNDC can provide technical expertise 
to the CTBTO, while also attending to Finnish na-
tional interests.
3.2.2 The analysis pipeline is a well 
established daily routine
The FiNDC routinely analyses all radionuclide 
measurement data generated at the IMS radionu-
clide stations across the world. The analysis pipe-
line is linked to the LINSSI database and equipped 
with an automated alarm system, to enable ef-
ficient and fully automated screening of the data. 
The IMS network is still developing, and the num-
ber of installed air filter stations was 66 at the end 
of 2015 (in the final stage there will be 80).
The number of IMS stations equipped with 
radioxenon measurement capabilities was 30 at 
the end of 2015. 24 IMS radioxenon systems 
were certified by the CTBTO at the end of 2015. 
Radioxenon measurements are especially impor-
tant for CTBT verification, because xenon, as 
a noble gas, may also leak from underground 
tests, which seldom release particulate matter. The 
operational stations generated more than 1,000 
gamma and beta-gamma spectra per day for the 
FiNDC analysis pipeline to handle. The particulate 
pipeline is well-established and has been running 
stably for many years. During 2015 the FiNDC 
tested and evaluated the radionuclide part of the 
“NDC-in-a-Box” analysis software provided by the 
CTBTO to all interested member states. The xenon 
analysis software in “NDC-in-a-Box” has been inte-
grated in the FiNDC operations as an optional tool 
for additional analysis of interesting events. 
In 2015, there were no indications of nuclear 
testing in the data provided by the CTBTO; neither 
were there any alarms by the Finnish Institute 
of Seismology or any other indications of possible 
nuclear tests that would have required the spe-
cial attention of the FiNDC. Xenon radioisotopes 
released from medical isotope production facili-
ties and NPP:s are regularly measured all around 
the globe. Anthropogenic nuclides with CTBT rel-
evance, mainly 99Tc, 131I from medical isotope pro-
duction and 137Cs from Chernobyl and Fukushima 
fallout are regularly measured at some particulate 
stations.
3.3 International cooperation
The implementation of safeguards in Finland was 
addressed at several meetings with the IAEA and 
the European Commission. In addition, STUK con-
tinued its participation in the ESARDA working 
groups, executive board and the steering commit-
tee meetings. A STUK expert finished his term as 
the chairperson of the ESARDA Novel Approaches/
Novel Technologies Working Group; whereas, an-
other STUK safeguards expert, continued with the 
vice-chairmanship of the Verification Technologies 
and Methodologies (VTM) Working Group. STUK 
experts also provided a few presentations at the 
INMM annual meeting and at the INMM/ESARDA 
joint workshop.
The progress at the Olkiluoto 3 unit, which has 
been under construction since 2003, and the more 
current authorisation of the planning and design 
of new nuclear facilities Olkiluoto 4, Hanhikivi 1 
and the enlargement of the spent fuel storage at 
Olkiluoto in 2010; and, moreover the licensing of 
the encapsulation plant and the geological reposi-
tory in 2015, have given STUK practical experience 
in implementing safety, security and safeguards for 
Figure 8. Introduction of nuclear material accountancy 
for a power reactor.
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new nuclear facilities. Owing to this, STUK experts 
have been invited on several occasions to provide 
guidance and share their experiences. 
Some of this cooperation has been facilitated 
via the Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA, 
but there have also been other mechanisms avail-
able to contribute to the worldwide cooperation. 
In 2014, the partnership programme between 
King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable 
Energy (K.A.CARE), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and 
STUK began supporting Saudi Arabia’s nuclear 
energy programme. In the field of safeguards and 
nuclear security, STUK’s safeguards and secu-
rity experts continued practical cooperation with 
their colleagues at K.A.CARE (Fig. 8.). In 2015, 
STUK assisted the U.S. DoE International Nuclear 
Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) by con-
tributing to the safeguards-by-design workshop 
held in Jakarta, Indonesia. The experiences from 
developing STUK requirement documents for new 
installations in particular in Olkiluoto with the 
aim to have safeguards to be included in the design 
and construction phases were demonstrated to 
the participants. In addition, the new facilities at 
the front- and back-ends of the fuel cycle – i.e. the 
extraction of uranium in mining and milling and 
the development of the geological repository – have 
widened the capabilities and scope of the Finnish 
national safeguards system.
3.3.1 Support programme to the IAEA
The Finnish Support Programme to the IAEA 
Safeguards (FINSP) is financed by the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs and coordinated by STUK. 
The FINSP was established in May 1988. In 2015 
FINSP was active in the areas of verification meth-
od development, development of safeguards guid-
ance to the IAEA Member States and in inspector 
training. 
A NDA verification method, Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomography (PGET), has been under de-
velopment by support programmes of USA, Sweden 
and the European Commission. The long lasting 
task JNT 1510 “Development of PGET prototype” 
started in 2004 was completed in 2015. FINSP is 
now providing support to the IAEA in the devel-
opment of the prototype further under task FIN 
A 1997” Passive Gamma Emission Tomography 
System Implementation Support”. The goal of the 
task is an approved NDA verification tool. At the 
end of 2015 the prototype is under electronics up-
grade, which will speed up the measurements. 
FINSP actively participates to the development 
of IAEA safeguards guidance to the Member States 
under the task: “Member State Contributions to 
IAEA Topical Guidance on Safeguards Implement-
ations, JNT C 1959”. The IAEA published a guide 
“Safeguards Implementation Practices Guide 
on Facilitating IAEA Verification Activities” in 
December 2014 a guide “Establishing and 
Maintaining State Safeguards Infrastructure” in 
February 2015. During the course of the year 2015 
IAEA planned outreach events to make these 
guides known in the Member States. FINSP par-
ticipated in the planning of and will contribute to 
these events, scheduled for the first half of 2016.
FINSP has also organised NDA training for 
the IAEA inspectors. A Spent Fuel Verification 
Training Course was held at the Loviisa NPP on 
16–19 November 2015, with the support and coop-
eration of the NPP operator Fortum.
3.3.2 Final disposal programme 
and the ASTOR group
The programmes for a geological repository for 
spent nuclear fuel in Sweden and Finland have 
reached the licensing phase, and the safeguards 
measures must be agreed to by all parties: facility 
designers, operators and the inspectorates. Thus, 
the IAEA and the presented their safeguards ap-
proaches at the last Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories (ASTOR) group’s meetings. 
In 2015, the group of experts met in Gyeongju, 
Republic of Korea on 20–22 April. There were 
about 30 participants attending the meeting and 
excursions to the underground low and interme-
diate radioactive waste disposal facility and the 
spent fuel dry storage facility at the Wolsong NPP. 
The next ASTOR meeting will be hosted by US 
in 2016. The aim is to report and summarise the 
achievements obtained during the 10 year period 
of the ASTOR group.
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3.4 Radiation monitoring at 
border crossing stations
STUK and Finnish Customs have a joint project for 
the radiation border monitoring of Finnish border-
crossing stations. The upgrading project, RADAR, 
is now changing its form and the work continues 
as a maintenance process, which continues for the 
time being. Major investments were made in 2015, 
but the delivery of the detectors will take place 
in early 2016. Long term maintenance contracts 
needed for sustaining the systems will be signed 
in the near future. In 2015, lots of effort was put 
in development of IT infrastructure and analysis 
methods, which will make it possible to imple-
ment national nuclear detection architecture. Data 
analysis of spectrometric detectors from different 
locations is now carried out automatically at the 
headquarters of STUK. Moreover, STUK experts 
have necessary tools at their disposal to provide 
support to the frontline officers in real time and 
based on accurate information from the radiation 
measurements. The architecture serves both fixed 
installations and mobile devices.
Border monitoring has several aims: it helps 
to find material out of regulatory control (MORC), 
and it is also a part of the detection architec-
ture combating the illicit trafficking of radioactive 
and nuclear materials, the proliferation of weap-
ons of mass destruction, and nuclear terrorism. 
In December 2015 a training event was organ-
ised for Finnish Customs officers in EU Nuclear 
Security Training Centre (SECTRA) in Karlsruhe, 
Germany. Altogether 12 Customs officers were 
trained in actual work scenarios, involving radio-
active and nuclear materials. In Figures 9 and 10 
there are examples of identification of a target in 
a vehicle for further investigations and laboratory 
analysis.
  
Figure 9. Training at fictive border crossing station.
Figure 10. Demonstration of measurement 
technologies at SECTRA.
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4 Human resources development
Nuclear materials safeguards implemented by 
the Nuclear Materials Section of STUK cover all 
typical measures of a State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC), and 
many other activities besides. The nuclear fuel cy-
cle-related activities such as research and develop-
ment activities not involving nuclear material or 
the manufacture of certain equipment as defined 
in the Additional Protocol have extended the scope 
of traditional safeguards. Nuclear safeguards on 
the national level are closely linked with the other 
functions of nuclear materials control and non-
proliferation: licensing, export control, border con-
trol, transport control, combating illicit trafficking, 
the physical protection of nuclear materials, and 
monitoring compliance with the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The continuous 
analysis of the developments in the involved fields 
of both technology and politics is a daily, multi-
disciplinary task in the STUK Nuclear Materials 
Section. Most of the experts working in Nuclear 
Materials Sections have also been reserved to work 
for STUK’s Emergency Preparedness as experts 
and in case of emergency. That is a good overall 
view of the whole scale work of STUK, and continu-
ous training keeps experts in touch.
The personnel’s competence is systematically 
developed, taking into account the needs of the 
organisation and the wishes of individuals. Those 
aiming at an expert’s career are valued as highly 
as those interested in managerial duties. One 
of the inspectors attended the national training 
course for nuclear waste management. 
Because of the restrictions of the State budget 
and its consequences for STUK’s resources, STUK 
undertook a reorganisation in accordance with its 
primary tasks and initiated the implementation of 
the consequent matrix organisation in 2013. Thus, 
when implementing the new strategy, it became 
important to launch a new kind of cooperation with 
other STUK units to optimise the use of skills and 
resources. Moreover, in 2014 cooperation with uni-
versities was initiated in order to re-locate budget-
ary funded research. Also, other actions to reduce 
costs took place, e.g. STUK regional laboratory in 
Rovaniemi was closed down and the traditional li-
brary services were concluded in 2015. The chang-
es did not substantially affect the oversight of the 
use of radiation or that of nuclear energy. 
In the new organisation, the cooperation with 
other units continues, and it is based on exchange 
of information, and consequent motivation and 
training. For example, the spent fuel verifica-
tion measurements are carried out by the staff of 
Environmental Radiation Surveillance. In addi-
tion, STUK Radiation Practices Regulation carries 
out regular inspections of organisations that use 
radioactive sources and small amounts of nuclear 
materials. During such inspections, it is possible to 
perform nuclear safeguards inspection in accord-
ance with the training and check-list previewed 
by the Nuclear Materials Section. Nuclear secu-
rity and safeguards may have varied aspects to 
the control of nuclear materials. Therefore, it is 
necessary to have close cooperation between these 
two units. Cooperation and good communication 
between different departments and units improve 
nuclear safety, security and safeguards in general. 
Information security is a joint concern of all units.
The distribution of the working days of the 
Nuclear Materials Section in the different duty 
areas is presented in Figure 11. Most of the work-
ing days are invoiced to the stakeholders. As seen 
in Figure 11, the duty areas are divided into those 
of direct oversight and inspections (basic opera-
tions), support functions including maintenance, 
development work for the regulatory functions and 
consultancy, including, e.g. international coopera-
tion financed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or 
the EU. However, the state budgetary funding con-
stitutes only about 2% of the total funding of the 
Nuclear Materials Section.
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The experts working for nuclear materials control. All staff members participate in the core safeguards tasks. 
Additionally, each person has some special areas of expertise to focus on.
Ms. Elina Martikka Section Head Management, international cooperation
Ms. Ritva Kylmälä Assistant Day-to-day business, archiving
Mr. Timo Ansaranta Senior Inspector Control of operators’ competence at facilities, inspections, declarations
Mr. Marko Hämäläinen Senior Inspector Safeguards regulation, Inspection coordination, Additional Protocol-related 
matters
Mr. Tapani Honkamaa Senior Inspector FINSP to the IAEA safeguards, measurements and verification methods
Mr. Mikael Moring Senior Inspector Finnish National Data Centre for the CTBT, safeguards for disposal of spent 
fuel
Mr. Olli Okko Senior Inspector Safeguards for geological repository, Additional Protocol-related oversight 
of R&D activities
Mr. Timo Wiander Senior Inspector Safeguards inspections and information security, until October 2015
 
95; 47 %
5; 2 %
83; 40 %
23; 11 %
Distribution of working days
Direct oversight and inspections
Budgetary funding
Support functions
Expert services
Figure 11. The distribution of working days of the Nuclear Materials Section in the various duty areas.
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5 Conclusions
STUK continued with national safeguards meas-
ures and activities with 76 inspection days and 
43 inspections. The implementation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in-
tegrated safeguards began in Finland on 15 
October 2008. Since 2010, the number of IAEA and 
European Commission inspections annually has 
been close to 20. The implementation of the IAEA 
integrated safeguards reduces the total number 
of annual routine inspections days of the inter-
national inspectorates, but includes short-notice 
random inspections. In order to be present at all of 
the short-notice IAEA inspections, STUK has had 
a daily on-call inspector. 
In 2015, STUK performed 31 safeguards inspec-
tions to the material balance areas of the Finnish 
nuclear power plants (NPP), 12 to the Loviisa NPP 
and 19 to the Olkiluoto NPP. The Commission took 
part in 14 and the IAEA in 17 of these inspections. 
The relative high number of IAEA inspections was 
higher than usual, due to the installation of new 
cameras that are suitable for remote data transfer. 
Since November 2015 the remote data transfer 
is applied to the safeguards surveillance at both 
NPPs. STUK performed one non-destructive assay 
measurement campaign at both NPPs. At other 
facilities, the Commission took part in the account-
ancy inspection and physical inventory verification 
at the VTT research reactor and the BTC verifica-
tion at the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, and 
together with the IAEA in the BTC and design 
information verification of the planned geological 
repository at the disposal site at Olkiluoto. The 
verification was carried out during a three-day 
long survey campaign by a joint team assisted by 
technicians from both inspectorates and the JRC. 
The total number of safeguards inspections in 2015 
was 43 for STUK, 16 for the Commission, and 17 
for the IAEA. The IAEA sent its safeguards state-
ments to the Commission, which amended them 
with its own conclusions and forwarded them to 
STUK. The conclusions by the Commission were 
in line with the IAEA’s remarks as well as with 
STUK’s own findings; there were no outstanding 
questions by the IAEA or the Commission at the 
end of 2015.
The results of STUK’s nuclear safeguards in-
spection activities continued to demonstrate that 
the Finnish licence holders take good care of their 
nuclear materials. There were no indications of un-
declared materials or activities, and the inspected 
materials and activities were in accordance with 
the stakeholders’ declarations. Neither the IAEA 
nor the Commission made any remarks, nor did 
they present any required actions based on their 
inspections. By means of their nuclear materials 
accountancy and control systems, the stakeholders 
enabled STUK to fulfil its own obligations under 
the international agreements relevant to nuclear 
safeguards and non-proliferation. The main open 
concern at the IAEA was about the initiation of 
remote data transmission at the Olkiluoto NPP. 
In contrast to this, STUK pointed out the need to 
have safeguards requirements clarified for the geo-
logical repository before the licensing of the dispos-
al facility. In general, the subsidiary arrangements 
and facility attachments should be updated for old 
facilities, and prepared for new ones.
In 2015, STUK's Nuclear Materials Section 
cooperated closely with the IAEA in order to share 
experiences and train authorities’ staff in countries 
that are aiming at nuclear programmes, i.e. urani-
um production or nuclear energy. STUK cooperated 
with Finnish Customs to offer expert advice in the 
development of radiation monitoring at borders, 
including training for Customs officers.
A major goal of all current Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) related activi-
ties is the entry into force of the CTBT itself. To 
reach this goal, major steps have to be taken in 
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the political arena, and an important prerequisite 
for positive political action is that the verification 
system of the CTBTO is functioning and able to 
provide assurance to all parties that it is impos-
sible to make a clandestine nuclear test without 
detection. The FiNDC is committed to its own role 
in the common endeavour so that the verification 
system of the CTBTO can accomplish its detection 
task. While still incomplete, the verification system 
has already demonstrated its ability to detect nu-
clear tests.
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7 Abbreviations and acronyms
ADR
European Agreement 
concerning the International 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods 
by Road
AP
Additional Protocol to the 
Safeguards Agreement
AQG
Atomic Questions Group of 
the Council of the European 
Union
ASTOR
Application of Safeguards to 
Geological Repositories
BTC
Basic Technical 
Characteristics
CA
Complementary Access
CBRN
Chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear 
(such as in “protective 
measures taken against 
CBRN weapons or hazards”)
CdZnTe
Cadmium zinc telluride
CTBT
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty
CTBTO
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization
DIQ
Design Information 
Questionnaire
DIV
Design Information 
Verification
DU
Depleted uranium
eFORK
enhanced FORK with a 
CdZnTe-gamma spectrometer 
(see FORK)
ES
Environmental Sampling
ESARDA
European Safeguards 
Research and Development 
Association
EU
European Union
FA
(1) Facility Attachment 
according to the Safeguards 
Agreement (INFCIRC/193), 
(2) Fuel Assembly
FiNDC
Finnish National Data 
Centre for the CTBT
FINSP
Finnish Support Programme 
to the IAEA Safeguards
FORK
Spent fuel verifier with 
gross gamma and neutron 
detection
GBUV
Gamma Burnup Verifier
GICNT
Global Initiative for 
Combating Nuclear 
Terrorism
HEU
High-enriched uranium, 20 % 
or more of U-235
HPGe
High-Purity Germanium
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IAEA
International Atomic Energy 
Agency
IMS
International Monitoring 
System (of the CTBTO)
ITU
Institute of Transuranium 
Elements in Karlsruhe
INFCIRC
Information Circular 
(IAEA document type, eg. 
INFCIRC/193, Safeguards 
Agreement, or INFCIRC/140, 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty)
INMM
Institute of Nuclear 
Materials Management 
IPPAS
International Physical 
Protection Advisory Service
IS
Integrated Safeguards
ISSAS
International SSAC Advisory 
Service
ITWG
International Technical 
Working Group for combating 
illicit trafficking of nuclear 
and other radioactive 
materials
JRC
The Joint Research Centre
KMP
Key Measurement Point
LEU
Low-enriched uranium, less 
than 20 % of U-235
LINSSI
an SQL database for gamma-
ray spectrometry
MBA
Material Balance Area
MEE
Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy
MFA
Ministry for Foreign Affairs
NDA
Non-Destructive Assay
NM
Nuclear Material
NPP
Nuclear Power Plant
NPT
The Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (INFCIRC/140, 
“Non-Proliferation Treaty”)
NSG
Nuclear Suppliers’ Group
NRC
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission
OECD/NEA
Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and 
Development /Nuclear 
Energy Agency
Onkalo
Underground rock 
characterisation facility (for 
the final disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel)
PGET
Passive Gamma Emission 
Tomography
PIT
Physical Inventory Taking
PIV
Physical Inventory 
Verification
PSP
Particular Safeguards 
Provisions
PTS
Provisional Technical 
Secretariat (to the 
Preparatory Commission of 
the CTBT)
Pu
Plutonium
RL07
Radionuclide Laboratory 
in the CTBT IMS network 
hosted by STUK (FIL07)
SA
Subsidiary Arrangements
SFAT
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester
SNRI
Short Notice Random 
Inspection
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SNUICA
Short notice, unannounced 
inspection, complementary 
access, on-call inspector
SSAC
State System of Accounting 
for and Control of Nuclear 
Materials
SSM
Swedish Radiation Safety 
Authority
Th
Thorium
U
Uranium
UI
Unannounced Inspection
UNSC
United Nations Security 
Council
VTT
Technical Research Centre of 
Finland
WGB
Working Group B (of the 
CTBTO)
YVL Guide
Regulatory Guide on Nuclear 
Safety (STUK requirements 
on safety, security and 
safeguards, in Finnish 
Ydinvoimalaitosohje)
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Table A1. Summary of nuclear fuel receipts in 2015.
To From FA LEU (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 Germany 110 19 178
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 96 16 607
Loviisa NPP, WL0V Russian Federation 180 22 638
 FA = fuel assembly; LEU = low-enriched uranium. 
APPENDIX 1 Nuclear materials in Finland in 2015
Table A2. Fuel assemblies at 31 December 2015.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
Olkiluoto 1, W0L1 1 128/540 192 990 851
Olkiluoto 2, W0L2 1 338/766 222 844 1 159
Olkiluoto, spent fuel 
storage, W0LS
7 212/7 212 1 217 893 10 303
Loviisa NPP, WL0V 5 811/5 029 676 197 6 265
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) Fuel assemblies (FA) in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa NPP 313 FAs and Olkiluoto NPP 500 FAs per reactor)
Table A3. Total amounts of nuclear material at 31 December 2015.
MBA Natural U (kg) Enriched U* (kg) Depleted U (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
W0L1 – 193 039 – 852 –
W0L2 – 222 890 – 1 160 –
W0LS – 1 217 893 – 10 303 –
WL0V – 676 197 – 6 265 –
WRRF 1 509 60.096 0.001 < 0.001 0.044
WFRS 1.842 0.537 374.1 ~0 0.346
WKK0 2 709.7 – – – –
WNNH 3 588.070 – – – –
WHEL 53.297 0.294 20.010 0.003 3.018
Minor holders 0.907 0.00116 1 158.6 ~ 0 0.291
MBA = material balance area, WRRF = VTT  Research Reactor, WFRS = STUK, WKK0 = Freeport Cobalt Oy, in Kokkola, WNNH = Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta,  
WHEL = Laboratory of Radiochemistry at the University of Helsinki, U = uranium. *) Less than 150 g of high-enriched uranium, mainly used in detectors.
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APPENDIX 2 Safeguards field activities in 2015
General information Inspections Inspection  person days
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
W0LS 21 January DSOS maintenance (XCAM mem. cards removed) 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 28 January SNRI (48 h notice) 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0LF 17 March Interim Inspection+ Site check 0 0 1 0 0 2
WFRS 17 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 18 March Interim Inspection + Site check 0 0 4 0 0 8
WRRF 27 March Site check 0 0 1 0 0 1
WNSC 27 March DIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 1 April Interim Inspection + Site check 0 0 2 0 0 4
WHEL 21 April PIV + Site check 0 0 2 0 0 4
W0L1,W0L2 28–29 April PIV, Pre-PIT 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0L1 10 May Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0LS 20 May SNRI 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L2 1 June Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 2 June Interim Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0F 8 June Interim Inspection 0 0 1 0 0 2
WFRS 11 June PIV 0 0 1 0 0 1
W0L1,W0L2, W0LS 23–24  June PIV, Post-PIT 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 5-6 August PIV, Pre-PIT 1 1 1 2 2 2
WL0V 7 August Pre-PIT (additional act.) 1 0 1 1 0 1
WL0V 16 August Lo 1 Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 25 August XCAM and XSOS maintenance (LO2) 1 0 1 1 0 1
WL0V 5 September Lo 2 Core verification 0 0 1 0 0 1
WL0V 22 23 September PIV (Post-PIT) 1 1 1 2 2 2
WNSC 24 September DIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
WRRF 24 September PIV 0 1 1 0 1 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 20 October Interim inspection 0 0 3 0 0 3
W0LF 10–12 November DIV 1 1 1 12 12 5
W0L3 10 November DIV 1 1 1 1 2 1
W0L1, W0L2, W0LS 11–12 November RDT equipment installation 1 0 1 2 0 1
WL0V 16 November FF verification, containment (seals) maintenance 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 17 November Containment (seals) maintenance 1 1 1 1 1 1
NDA MEASUREMENTS
W0L2 18–21 August GBUV 0 0 1 0 0 13
WL0V 2–3 November FORK 0 0 1 0 0 6
TOTAL 17 16 43 31 30 76
Note: At the Olkiluoto NPP, inspections are counted per MBA. MBA = material balance area, PIV = Physical Inventory Verification, CV = Core Verification,  
CA = Complementary Access, ES = Environmental Sampling, NM = nuclear material, SFAT/eFORK/GBUV = methods of non-destructive assay. RDT equipment instal-
lation at TVO Olkiluoto NPP are accounted as one activity.
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APPENDIX 3 International agreements and national 
legislation relevant to nuclear safeguards in Finland
Valid legislation, treaties and agreements concern-
ing safeguards of nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items at the end of 2015 in Finland (Finnish 
Treaty Series, FTS):
1. The Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 
as amended.
2. The Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 
1988/161 as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 Septem-
ber 1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
•	 Regulation	No	5,	amendment	of	the	list	in	
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
•	 Regulation	No	9,	article	197,	point	4	of	the	
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 setting 
up a Community regime for the control of ex-
ports, transfer, brokering, and transit of dual-
use items as amended by the Commission Del-
egated Regulation (EU) No 2420/2015. 
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69). Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959, as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
17. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Korea and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy entered into 
force on 1.1.2015 (FTS 5/2015).
18. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation   and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy entered into 
force on 6.4.2015 (FTS 32/2015).
19. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Between The 
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi-Arabia 
And The Government of the Republic of Fin-
land, signed on 8.9.2015.
20. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(FTS 15/2001). This treaty was ratified by Fin-
land on January 15, 1999, but will not enter 
into force before it is ratified by all 44 states 
listed in Annex II of the treaty.
